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ABSTRACT  
 
For many Egyptians, the only path to modernity in the Egyptian 
legal system is believed to be through utilizing Islamic sharia’a. 
Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Egyptian legal 
elite worked to introduce a modern interpretation and application of 
Islamic sharia’a. The Islamic principles takhayur and talfiq were 
used to do this. While the main usage of takhayur and talfiq was to 
legitimize the modern legal system by maintaining the usage of 
Islamic sharia’a, the legal practice reached a contradictory 
outcome. The Courts have been unable to decide on the exact 
relationship between Islamic sharia’a and other legal texts. This 
confusion has produced ambiguity and uncertainty in legal practice. 
This situation of uncertainty in the legal system is inevitable 
because of the differences in the underlying nature and philosophy 
of the modern and sharia’a legal systems. Accordingly, the 
Egyptian legal system may require additional secular reform to 
reduce the uncertainty by stressing the superiority of the legal text. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the 25th of January uprising, laws has been at the core of discussions 
among Egyptians. Egyptians generally believes that laws are closely connected 
to the political system, and that developing and amending laws is an important 
avenue for solving many problems. Despite the fact that the development of laws 
is demanded by most Egyptians, there is no clear understanding of an 
appropriate path. Debates about how to best develop Egyptian laws often ends 
with disagreement on the identity of laws, and specifically whether they are 
Islamic or secular.  
Followers of the debates within Egyptian communities will easily note how the 
debate often focuses on Islamicity. Even the non-Islamic political groups, 
whether socialist or mainstream liberal, defend their point of view based on the 
level of Islamicity of their views and conformity with Islamic legal jurisprudence or 
fiqh.  
There is a confused understanding of legal development through the traditions of 
Islamic Sharia’a and Fiqh. This is based on ignorance of the nature of both the 
Islamic and modern legal systems. Modern law is based on the existence of only 
one legal answer to every legal problem, but Islamic application is based on the 
existence of multiple legal answers from the different Islamic schools or 
madhabs. So while a modern law system supports one set of connected legal 
rules for governing, Islamic jurisprudence has its different schools each with its 
own understandings. 
In modern law, all people are obliged to follow the same legal rule; jurists’ 
opinions are not obligatory for any court or state authority to follow. But under the 
sharia’a system, deciding the applicable rule depends on the free will of people 
and which schools they favor. This difference is very important to understand 
when considering the melding of both secular and Islamic systems.  
This research discusses the application of Islamic principles, takhayur and talfiq, 
in the modernization of the Egyptian legal system. It has not created a modern 
legal system, rather it has created a hybrid legal system with tensions between 
the ideologies of both sharia’a and modernity evident.  
The research focuses on an understanding of the historic chronology of the 
introducing of modernity into the Egyptian legal system, through exploring 
opinions of well-known thinkers such as Muhammad Abdou and Abdulraziq Al-
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Sanhuri in addition to Western influence. It shows how this hybrid modernity has 
led to problems in the application. This is because of the principles of takhayur 
and talfiq in and of themselves has not lead to the Islamizing of the legal system 
but rather the creation of rigidity in the developing of laws due to the divine 
nature of Islamic rules. This is clarified in the discussion of Court rulings 
regarding the interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, and Article 
60 of the Egyptian Penal Code. 
The amendment of family laws in 2000 is an example of the hybrid legal system 
issue. Many social groups opposed such amendment claiming that the new code 
is less Islamic than the old one. This claim is based on the allowance of self-
divorce for women, or Khul’, in the new code. This is a clear application of 
takhayur and talfiq whereby the new text adopted the minor opinion of a group in 
the Malikite School which believes that self-divorce is granted according to their 
understanding of a prophetic telling.1 However, many legal experts believe that 
this law is not in conformity with Islamic sharia’a and defend the old law as being 
much more Islamic. At the same time however takhayur and talfiq was also 
utilized in the former family law to generate the former rules of marriage. The 
rejection was not based on the usage of takhayur and talfiq, but was directed 
more towards the believed Islamicity of the former law against the new 
amendment.2This is a clear example of the problematic situation of considering 
state modern laws incorporating Islamic sharia’a. Of course this Islamic dialogue 
is present in some laws more than others, such as family, criminal and civil laws. 
But the effect of such a linkage between religion and law affects the legal and 
political practice as a whole. 
This paper argues that modernizing Egyptian laws through Islamic sharia’a 
principles of takhayur and talfiq has confused the understanding of the position of 
Islamic sharia’a in the modern legal system. This confused understanding is a 
result of differences between both Islamic and modern legal systems. This is 
seen in the Egyptian high courts’ decisions regarding the interpretation of Islamic 
sharia’a and its position in the legal system. 
                                                          
1 See Oussama Arabi, The Dawning of the Third Millennium on Shari’: Egypt’s 
Law no. 1 of 2000, or Women May Divorce at Will, Vol. 16, No.1 ALQ (2001), pp. 
2-21. 
2 See J.N.D. ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN EGYPT: 1850-1950, POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN EGYPT, at 209-230, in P.M. HOLT (ED.), London: 
Oxford University Press, 1968. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
3 
 
The following chapter gives a brief background on the transition from the 
traditional legal system to the current one. This will be shown through the historic 
reasons for and the philosophy of using takhayur and talfiq to modernize the 
legal system. The third chapter analyzes for the use of takhayur and talfiq in the 
modern legal system. It focuses on the differences between sharia’a and modern 
legal system, and the unprecedented results of that application. In chapter four, 
Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution which states that Islamic sharia’a is the 
principal source of legislation, will be analyzed through the judicial verdicts from 
the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Constitutional Court. In chapter five, 
Article 60 in the Egyptian Penal code which exempts actions committed in 
accordance with Islamic sharia’a from the application of penal code, will be 
analyzed. It will be shown through the Court of Cassation verdicts how the 
sharia’a interpretation is very problematic and that the court has classified it at 
times as being superior to the legal text, and at other times as being inferior to it. 
The court also uses Islamic sharia’a to defend the existing laws and to interpret 
its legal texts. 
II. From Traditionalism to Modernity: The Path of The Egyptian Legal 
System 
Starting in the late nineteenth century, the Egyptian legal system has been 
transformed from the traditional Islamic Sharia’a system into a more modern 
legal system. This transition has been accompanied by extensive juridical and 
legal reform. Since this transitional phase, an extended debate regarding the 
Islamicity of the Egyptian legal system compared to the secular western laws has 
occurred. This debate has been led by modernist thinkers, whereby they have 
introduced their new vision and understanding of Islamic Sharia’a laws. The 
modernist thinkers are not only legal figures such as Abdulraziq Al-Sanhuri, but 
also religious figures such as Muhammad Abdou who headed the religious 
institution of Dar el-e’ftaa’ as the Mufti. From the beginning it was clear that 
reform of the legal system and the traditional application of Islamic laws was 
required. This necessity was aroused by several problems faced by Egyptians 
during that time especially after the colonization era. While this reform targeted 
the clarity of the legal rule, it embedded legal uncertainty as it progressed.  
One of the major ideas of that movement was introducing Islamic fiqh techniques 
as a development tool. It was thought that legal reform was possible through 
Islamic sharia’a itself. One of the techniques was borrowing the concepts of 
takhayur and talfiq from the classical application of Islamic sharia’a to introduce 
legal reform. Although the usage of these techniques was a brilliant innovation, 
the problematic understanding of the situation of Islamic sharia’a in the modern 
legal system would later introduce contradictions and ambiguity in their 
application, which continue to this day. 
In this chapter, the traditional understanding of takhayur and talfiq will be 
introduced through their legal and religious application. The second part focuses 
on the necessity of an emerging new modern legal system. The ideas of 
Egyptian legal thinkers and the legal and political situation of the Egyptian state 
will also be explored. 
A. Takhayur and Talfiq: 
The application of Islamic sharia’a is historically known through the 
understandings of various schools or madhabs3. The Islamic application of divine 
                                                          
3 To understand the meaning of Madhab, see W.B.HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND 
EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW, 150, (Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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regulations was generally achieved through different methods of interpretation of 
religious texts of the holy book Quran, and the prophetic sayings or Hadiths of 
the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. The method of interpretation of the religious 
texts depended on particular historical chronologies that differed from one school 
to another; each method of understanding represented a separate school or 
madhab. Each school had its own logic to achieve its particular legal outcome, 
whether through established legal rules or general understanding of Islamic 
Sharia’a. Traditionally, it was a common practice to apply the jurisdiction of 
different Islamic schools or madhabs at the same time. But not every school had 
the same chances to be applied. It depended historically on a school’s popularity 
and reputation, or the state’s support for such school.4 Accordingly takhayur and 
talfiq techniques emerged due to the existence of different jurisdictions of Islamic 
schools. Takhayur and talfiq were organized differently by the traditional Islamic 
schools. In the following section brief definitions of takhayur and talfiq will be 
illustrated with examples of its traditional application and the position of the 
modern Islamic religious institution of Dar el-e’ftaa’.   
1. Takhayur Definition: 
Firstly takhayur means literally: the selection. It represents the process of 
choosing among the different opinions of Islamic scholars and madhabs with no 
limitation on the range of Islamic schools.5 It is based on the well-known principle 
that “an ordinary layperson is not a school follower” or “Al-’amy la’ mazhab lahu”.6 
This means that each ordinary human being who is not a scholar or a student of 
one of the scholars or sheikhs, has the right to choose among the different 
opinions and select whichever opinion applies best to his personal issue.7  
 
This principle of takhayur was widely accepted in Islamic sharia’a. Most Islamic 
schools did not deny the right of each person to utilize takhayur, as long as 
he/she was committed to the opinion of the selected school. For example, if 
                                                          
4 See generally W.B. HALLAQ, SHARI’: THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS, 159-
221, (Cambridge: CUP, 2009). 
5 Id, at 448. 
6 See Dr. Abdulaziz Ezzat El-Khayat, Al’Akhz Bel Rukh’as wa Hukmahu, Vol. 8, 
MAJALLAT MUJAMA’ AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI, at 237-255, (2010), available at 
http://shamela.ws/browse.php/book-8356/page-12243#page-12245; also see the 
Taqlid And Talfiq Section on The official website of Egyptian Dar el-e’ftaa 
website, 20/11/2012, http://dar-
alifta.org.eg/AR/ViewFatawaConcept.aspx?ID=127, (last viewed 1/9/2016). 
7 Id. 
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following the Hanafite school in marriage, all issues related to the marriage and 
divorce required the consideration of the Hanafite School.8 
2. Talfiq Definition: 
Secondly, talfiq means the connecting, mixing or amalgamation of schools’ 
opinions. Sometimes a person may combine different opinions of Islamic schools 
and madhabs to reach a new opinion. This is known as talfiq, which is an 
amalgamation of two jurisprudential opinions in order to achieve a third outcome 
found to be more beneficial. Accordingly, takhayur is the first step taken towards 
talfiq. But unlike takhayur, the talfiq technique was disputed in the traditional 
Islamic schools.9 This is because the application of talfiq led to new applications 
of legal rules that may contradict with the logic of ordinary schools. In general 
Islamic schools were keen on applying their vision of sharia’a, but talfiq led to the 
application of new hybrid opinions that do not represent a single school.  
3. Application of Takhayur and Talfiq in The Traditional Islamic 
Context: 
To best understand the controversy, it is important to understand that in Islamic 
Sharia’a there is a differentiation between relations between people, or 
Moa’amalat, and one’s relation to God, or A’aebadat. In the sharia’a application, 
the Islamic principles are applied in both instances. Accordingly, takhayur and 
talfiq can be applied to the rules organizing religious obligations such as prayers, 
or intra-personal relations such as contracts and marriage. Traditionally, it was 
acceptable for takhayur and talfiq techniques to be used by individuals between 
each other or to God, but this did not apply to state authorities, unlike the modern 
trend of its use by the legislative authorities.10 
 
Islamic schools took different positions regarding the application of talfiq. Some 
schools strictly limited its scope of application, while others broadened the scope. 
To understand the traditional understanding of talfiq, it is important to differentiate 
between two types of amalgamation or talfiq whether through branches of 
Sharia’a or within certain issues related to one of the sharia’a branches. For 
                                                          
8 Id 6, also supra note 2 at 420-421, Modernizing Egyptian law.  
9 See supra note 6. 
10 Supra note 2, There was another tool of justification for the governor’s actions 
which is al-Syasa al- Shara’ia but takhayur and talfiq were not generally from 
these tools, supra note 4.  
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example, if one person applied the opinions of one scholar in his prayers, and 
opinions of another scholar in his commercial relations, it is known as taqlid or 
the “following” of scholars. It is considered to be a form of takhayur only, with no 
talfiq or amalgamation taking place.11  
 
The second form of application to particular issues is the talfiq, which means 
mixing the opinions of two different scholars to reach a third opinion. For 
example, talfiq is exhibited when a man marries a woman with no custodian or 
wali in accordance with the Hanafite School; the same person requires the 
custodian’s approval for his second marriage in accordance with the Shafiite 
School. Here, the same man uses two different and contradictory opinions of 
scholars to conclude his two marriage contracts.12 
Generally, Islamic scholars classify talfiq into three types: the rejected, the 
possibly accepted and the preferably accepted.13 Most classical schools limit the 
talfiq to particular cases, widening the scope of the rejected talfiq. Their 
justification for widening the scope of rejection is that talfiq is meant to ease the 
life of Muslims where different Islamic schools exist, but talfiq is not to waste the 
essence of Islamic rule through chasing exceptions or rukhas of different 
opinions.14  
 
There are several conditions set by these scholars for talfiq to be valid. Firstly it 
must not follow the exceptions and allowances, or rukhas, because such 
following wastes the purpose of the sharia’a rule. One example of that is 
employing talfiq among different schools’ opinions to conclude a marriage 
contract with no witnesses, custodian or the marriage payment or mahr.15 
Secondly, it must not affect the legal impact and consequences of the opinions 
employed. For example, if someone claims that according to most Sunni schools 
all alcohol, or ‘Anbeeza, is strictly forbidden, or haram, and according to the 
Hanafite School, alcohol or ‘Anbeeza, except wine, is not forbidden as long as a 
                                                          
11 Supra note 4, and supra note 6 
12 See Fahd Bin Abdul Rahman Al-Yahia, Dwabet el-ikhtiar bayn Aqwal Al-
Foqaha’ fe masa’il El-Iktsad El-Islami, or Guidelines for Selection from the 
Statements of Muslim Jurists in Matters Relating to Islamic Economics, at 515-
560, (The Seventh International Conference Of Islamic Economy Working Paper 
Group, April 2008, available at 
http://www.kau.edu.sa/Files/121/Researches/56917_27234.pdf).   
13 Supra note 6. 
14 See supra note 6. 
15 Supra note 4 and 6. 
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person does not get drunk. Deduction from the first opinion that wine is a form of 
alcohol, and then another deduction in accordance with second opinion that wine 
is not haram as long as no person gets drunk is a form of the rejected talfiq.16 
Thirdly, the most essential condition for talfiq to be valid is that it must be 
concluded by an ordinary layperson or Al’amy, who is not a scholar, follower, or 
student of any madhab. However, there were minor opinions accepting the 
application of talfiq by the governor or sahib wilaya.17  
4. Current Official Religious Institution Position 
The official institution of fatwa in Egypt, Dar el-e’ftaa, describes the talfiq as an 
accepted tool as long as it is not against the consensus of scholars or ijmaa’, 
because it is a tool of convenience and development of the people’s interest.18 
This institution represents the new trend of Islamic thinking by widening the 
scope of application of talfiq to ease the requirements of life. This coincides with 
modernist elite thinking about the application of Sharia’a in modern law. Dar el-
e’ftaa makes one single limitation on the application of talfiq that is that it not 
contradict with Ijmaa’ or the consensus of scholars and jurists of a certain age. 
According to this understanding of Dar el-e’ftaa every age has its own special 
Ijmaa’ that must be followed. Accordingly in modern times, the Ijmaa’ application 
is narrowed to a few consensual opinions only which allows greater talfiq 
application.  
 
To sum up takhayur and talfiq are Islamic techniques that have been utilized to 
solve the problems associated with the multi-jurisdiction of Islamic schools within 
the same society and under the same authority. While takhayur is generally 
accepted by them, the talfiq is limited by most schools, the modern religious 
institution of Dar el-e’ftaa’ has widened the scope in favor of modernism. 
B. The Necessity of A New Understanding of Islamic Law 
Modernism was introduced to the Egyptian state and society with the French 
invasion of Egypt between 1798 and 1801. Since this time, the Egyptian state 
and social elite have become increasingly interested in successful modern 
models of European states. This interest and admiration is not separate from the 
complex and problematic application of the traditional Islamic legal system. 
                                                          
16 See supra note 2. 
17 Supra note 6 and 12. 
18 See supra note 6. 
II. FROM TRADITIONALISM TO MODERNITY: THE PATH OF THE EGYPTIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM 
9 
 
Reform of the legal system was a very accepted idea especially in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. The ideology of modernity challenged the Islamic 
understanding of a legal rule and its application. The conservative Islamic elite 
rejected the reform on the basis of Western legal systems. In addition to the 
social and political interest in maintaining the Islamic religious system, the state 
joined the side of the conservatives in rejecting modernism. Such state support 
did not last for a long time because of the unprecedented application of Western 
laws in the Egyptian territories which increased interest in developing the legal 
system. Accordingly, the only accepted proposition of modernity is that linked to 
Islamic sharia’a to avoid the complications of the traditional system and to 
maintain the religious sentiment of the social and political elite. Historically, most 
modern reform ideas were represented in the Islamic context and as a valid 
application of Islamic sharia’a.  
The following section will briefly describe the historic reasons for requiring reform 
of the judicial and legal system. This is followed by a discussion of the most 
important ideas of modernity introduced to Egyptian society since the nineteenth 
century by the most influential thinkers of the time, most notably Rifa’a Tahtawi, 
Muhammad Abdou and AbdulRaziq Al-Sanhuri.  
1. Required Judicial And Legal Review  
To understand the necessity for modernizing the legal system in Egypt, it is 
useful to understand the legal system existing at that time and understanding 
Western influence and interference in the Egyptian legal system.  
a. The Existing Legal System 
Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Egyptian legal system was 
completely based on the traditional application of Islamic laws or sharia’a, which 
is based on the principle of authority or wilaya. The traditional principle of wilaya 
means that the governor’s authority is the rightful author or waly al’-amr which 
includes the judicial authority. According to this theory there is no clear distinction 
between the judicial authority and the executive one. Governors, ministers, chiefs 
of state different councils and even administrative members may make judicial 
decisions. And parallel to this is the governor or state chief appointing of the 
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judge or qadi to exercise an additional form of judicial and legal authority. In this 
way there is a dual nature of judicial decisions in the state.19 
The second feature of the traditional judicial system is the multiplicity of legal 
answers, which is unlike the modern legal system. The traditional Islamic sharia’a 
system is based on Islamic schools’ understandings and interpretation of 
religious texts, which is known generally as fiqh. The Islamic fiqh is based on a 
certain understanding and interpretation of religious scripture – the Quran and 
the prophetic sayings or hadiths. Each school defines its own tools for extracting 
the legal rule from these texts and how to arrive at the correct understanding.  
The legal field at that time was multijurisdictional; all of the existing Islamic 
schools could be applied separately or from drawing among them, unless the 
ruler or the governor forbade it. It was commonly known that judicial decisions, 
even from the same qadi, who apply different Islamic schools’ opinions to the 
same legal issue, create multiple legal answers for it. This feature of the legal 
system was commonly known as a judicial forum, whereby litigants chose the 
favored judge or school to ensure their legal interests. 
b. Western Influence And Legal Reform 
By the end of the Muhammad’s Ali period in 1844, special courts had been 
created in Egypt known as the consulate courts. These courts were administered 
by foreign and Western embassies. Judges were not Egyptian, and the 
governing legal texts were not Egyptian laws or Islamic sharia’a but the Western 
laws of each state. When an applicant, whether Egyptian or foreign, was required 
to stand before this court, and if an appeal was required, it would be held in the 
foreign state’s court of appeal.20 This situation continued till 1875 when a new 
judicial authority was established: the mixed courts.21 These mixed courts were 
composed of Egyptian and foreign judges who applied laws on Egyptian land, 
regarding cases involving inter-Egyptian and non-Egyptian parties. Mixed courts 
played a major role in introducing modern laws to Egypt, and the understanding 
of the European judges of such modern laws.  
Both the consulate and mixed courts were introduced as a privileged system 
within the Ottoman state in general, under whose authority Egypt rested. Most of 
                                                          
19 See supra note 1 and supra note 3.  
20 See MUHAMMAD 'ABD AL-BARI, AL-'LMTIYAZAT AL-AJNABIYYAH, 23-32, (Al-
Qahirah: Lajnat Al-Ta'lif Wal-Taijamah Wal-Nashr, 1930). 
21 Id. 
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the cases decided before these courts were commercial in nature due to the 
common trade enjoyed by the Western states. By 1850, it was not an unusual 
phenomenon for the Ottoman state to issue a commercial code to be used by the 
mixed courts to ensure foreigners’ interests in the state; this new commercial 
code was translated from the French code with no apparent change.22  
At this point it is important to focus on the French judicial system which inspired 
the new legal system. By this time in the nineteenth century, the new French 
legal elite, including judges and lawyers, still maintained the theological 
understanding of laws. Through these understandings, many attempts by French 
courts were made to utilize those understandings in the interpretation and 
application of civil code texts. French courts applied texts of their own civil code 
of that time in accordance with their own religious and theological 
understandings, but with no reference to that process in their legal work. Such 
application was introduced by the French judges in the mixed courts as an 
ideological innovation, and was adopted later by the Egyptian legal elite. 23 
By 1883, national courts had been established to solve the multijurisdictional 
problems existing at that time. However, these national courts did not totally 
replace the authority of the traditional judges. The total replacement would not 
happen until a few decades later with the abolishment of the traditional judicial 
system of qadi shara’i. The clearest sign of the transformation taking place during 
this period was the existence of new codifications, such as the commercial and 
civil codes. Both the civil and commercial codes were translations of the 
corresponding French codes. This was obvious in the work of the national court 
judges who were required to navigate the ambiguity of the legal texts of the 
French system.24 
c. Codification Trend: 
The codification of legal rules was the most popular focus since the national 
courts’ establishment in 1883; it was not restricted to the Egyptian legal system 
but extended to other Islamic states which adopted forms of codification. Even 
                                                          
22 See Heba Abdel Halim Sewilam, The Jurisprudential Problems of the Early 
Codification Movement in the Middle East: a Case Study of the Ottoman Mejelle 
and the 1949 Egyptian Civil Code, at 130, (PHD dissertation in Islamic Studies, 
University of California, 2011); also supra note 20. 
23 See id Heba Sewilam, at 60.  
24 See ENID HILL, AL-SANHURI AND ISLAMIC LAW, THE PLACE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ISLAMIC LAW IN THE LIFE AND WORK OF ABDALRAZZAQ AL-SANHURI, 120, (Cairo 
Papers In Social Sciences, Volume 10, Monograph 1, Spring 1987). 
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the Ottoman state, which represented the last Islamic caliphate, adopted the 
codification of legal rules, whereas the Hanafite doctrine was represented in an 
equivalent code to that of the civil code. 25 This code was called Al-Majalla al-
ahkam al-‘adliyya, or the Magazine of Justice Rules. While it was not actually 
applied in Egypt, the experiment influenced the legal thinking of Arabs and 
Muslims including Egyptian thinkers alike.26 
Another codification attempt of the Islamic sharia’a was by Muhammad Qadri 
Pasha, a former judge and legal thinker of that time. He believed in the 
mechanism of the Napoleonic code while maintaining his deep belief in applying 
the religious rules of Islamic Sharia’a. Accordingly, he worked with others on 
codifying the Islamic sharia’a in Al-murshid or The Guide, which he considered 
as an Islamic replacement of the corresponding French civil law and to organize 
commercial transactions. Later on, he attempted to codify the personal status 
code based on the Hanafite doctrine, similar to the Al-Majalla in the Ottoman 
state. They introduced al-waqf law, or religious endowments, also named qanun 
al-‘ada wal- insaf, which later on was heavily criticized by Al-Sanhuri for being an 
exception to the civil code rules by deviating from and minimizing its grounds.27 
2. Introducing Modernity: 
By the end of the first half of the nineteenth century, many Egyptian writers and 
thinkers promoted the concept of the modern Western legal and political systems 
as successful examples that could also be employed in Egypt. Emphasis on the 
similarity between these systems and Islamic sharia’a systems was made.   
a. Rifa’a Tahtawi  
Rifa’a Tahtawi, one of the well-known Egyptian thinkers of that era, introduced in 
his book The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris the French legal and 
political system. He published that book after finishing his education in France, 
which was organized under the authority of Muhammad Ali. In his book, he 
included an early Arabic translation of the French constitution existing at that 
time. He did not simply translate the constitution.  He also introduced his vision 
                                                          
25 See GUY BECHOR, THE SANHURI CODE AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN ARAB 
CIVIL LAW, 32-37, (Brill, Leiden Boston, 2007). 
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system through analyzing and criticizing Al-Majalla application in Iraq and Syria, 
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and ideas about the similarity between French constitutional principles and 
Islamic sharia’a principles, with repeated emphasis on the consistency between 
modern legal texts and Islamic sharia’a. Tahtawi not only translated what he saw 
in the French legal system, but indirectly proposed the adoption of the modern 
French system in Egypt. One of the ways Tahtawi did this was by using Islamic 
terms in his translation. For example, he translated democracy as shura, which is 
an Islamic term referring to the reconciliation methodology of making decisions. 
He affirmed that the shura principle in Islamic understanding is equivalent to 
democracy. Another example is Tahtawi’s translation of taxes into zakat, in an 
effort to compare the monetary system of the Western state to that of the 
traditional Islamic one, whereby zakat was collected by the state as its main 
financial resource and based on a religious obligation.28  
The most important innovation of Tahtawi was to consider law as being 
equivalent to both Shari’ and Sharia’a, bridging the difference between both legal 
systems. He claimed that the Western legal system is the same as traditional 
Islamic sharia’a, and suggested adoption of modern legal techniques to develop 
the Egyptian legal system.29 
b. Muhammad Abdou  
Tahtawi’s attempt to relate modernization to Islamic sharia’a was not unique to 
that century. This idea continued to develop among thinkers including 
Muhammad Abdou, a well-known Egyptian Mufti in the late nineteenth century. 
Muhammad Abdou, who was an Al-Azhar student and politician fighting the 
authoritarian political system of the British occupation,30 was granted a very 
unique position as judge of the national courts in 1888.31 Abdou, who believed 
Aristotle’s philosophy of reason, introduced a new understanding of traditional 
Islamic Sharia’a. He affirmed the acceptance of all Islamic schools as long as 
these schools did not contradict the basic core of religion. Accordingly, all Islamic 
schools whether Sunni or Shiite were considered to be valid legal sources. 
                                                          
28 See, RIFA‘A RAFI‘ AL-TAHTAWI, AN IMAM IN PARIS, ACCOUNT OF STAY IN FRANCE 
BY AN EGYPTIAN CLERIC (TAKHLIS AL-EBRIZ FI TALKHIS BARIZ AW AL-DIWAN AL-
NAFIS BI-IWAN BARIS), 15-29 &189-194, Daniel L. Newman trans. &ed., SAQI, 
2004), (1826-1831). 
29 See id. 
30 See, Aswita Taizir, Muhammad ‘Abduh And The Reformation Of Islamic Law, 
at 7-10, (MA Dissertation In Islamic Studies, The Institute Of Islamic Studies, 
MCGILL University, Montreal, Canada, 1994). 
31 Id,  at 12. 
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Abdou believed that God gave to humankind practical and theoretical authority 
and through them the development of laws was accepted as long as it did not 
reject major Islamic beliefs.32 Abdou, who was known as a religious reformer, 
introduced the takhayur technique as the preferred legal implement that could be 
applied by state authorities to achieve development and modernity, especially 
through judicial and legislative authorities. 33 
In an article in al-Ahram, Abdou emphasized the necessity of benefiting from 
modern science. He suggested, as a revolutionary idea, studying other religious 
and legal systems to create such development: 
The ‘ulama (scientists) who are the spirit of the nation have failed so far 
to see the benefit of the modern sciences. They continue to busy 
themselves with what might have been suitable for a time that is long 
gone by, not realizing the fact that we are living in a new world. We must 
study the affairs of other religions and states in order to learn the secret 
of their advancement. We see no reason for their position of wealth and 
power except their progress in education and the sciences in their 
countries.34 
 
Abdou proposed the reform of traditional Islamic courts or Mahakem shara’ia, 
which were still employing traditional judicial procedures. These ideas were the 
grounds for later reform of the Islamic law application in the modern legal 
model.35  
 
Abdou faced the problem of the contradiction between the traditional application 
of talfiq and its new approach. Traditionally, talfiq could only be concluded by an 
ordinary layperson who is not a school follower. Abdou suggested that Ijtihad, the 
Islamic principle of getting legal rules out of religious scripts, is necessarily 
concluded by the governors of the state or wali al-amr.36 Such a requirement was 
necessary because the state governors were qualified by their positions to 
determine and achieve the people’s interests or maslaha musrsala.37 The state 
also got help from a wide range of experts including scientists and jurists, who 
could maintain the people’s interests or maslaha musrsala and the Islamicity of 
application. 38 
                                                          
32 id at 24 – 27. 
33 See supra note 22. 
34 Supra note 30, at 7. 
35 Supra note 30, at 14-15. 
36 Supra note 30, at 29 & 34 – 38.  
37 Supra note 30, at 24-29. 
38 Supra note 30, at 34-38, Abdou stated that Ijtihad could be concluded by army 
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As a judge, Abdou sought the singularity of the legal answer which is a modern 
approach. He realized that people would never unify their religious school or 
opinions of interpretation. Abdou mentioned one of the Quran verses, Hud 118, 
which states that “Lord God did not will to create one people”. God’s will is 
represented by the existence of numerous schools and interpretations of the 
same text. Each opinion is based on a different vision of what the interests of the 
people or masalih are.39 At the same time, Abdou criticized the existing modern 
codes issued after the creation of the national courts. Those laws were more or 
less a translation of the corresponding French laws. He considered them as 
ignoring the message of God and Islamic sharia’a. He proposed an entirely new 
talfiq among Islamic schools to achieve a sort of modern legal system, similar to 
that of Western states but in Islamic form. This talfiq is based on the interests of 
society and not bound by certain madhabs or methodologies of interpretation.40 
There was a broader field from which to formulate new legislation deemed 
justifiable on the basis of new ijtihad rules. He rejected the old application of 
Islamic schools who considered this set of rules as the only representation of 
Islamic messages from God, while other interpretations considered them as kufr, 
or ungodly.41 And, he considered all Islamic schools as being valid. Abdou’s idea 
was that all Islamic schools emanated from an understanding of the same Islamic 
scripture to achieve God’s will. Thus, they all target the goodness of people, and 
represent good faith.42 
c. Abdul-Raziq Sanhuri 
Another thinker who believed in modernity through Islamic sharia’a was Abdul-
Raziq Sanhuri. He, as a well-known legal thinker, imagined a broader solution for 
such chaos in the juridical and legal application in Egypt. He believed in the new 
modern understanding of Islamic sharia’a that was adopted by Muhammad 
Abdou. He employed these ideas through comparative legal thinking as a law 
professor and judge, and considered Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh as a source of 
modern civil law.43 
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Sanhuri emphasized the special nature of the proposed modern civil code as 
leading to the emergence of a new modern Islamic jurisprudence in his speech 
before the Egyptian senate in 1948:  
In it we put together the codified provisions of the Islamic law and set 
them beside western law, as represented in the new Egyptian code…and 
this paves the way for the third and final stage, the rebirth of Islamic 
jurisprudence, … for the day when this jurisprudence becomes the 
source of modern civil provisions, when it becomes as well- adapted to 
the currents of the civilization of the present age as the most modern and 
progressive codes. 44 
 
Sanhuri adopted a clear understanding of Islamic sharia’a as a source of law 
similar to Roman law in Western legal systems. He believed that modernizing the 
Egyptian legal system should take place through the principles of Islamic 
sharia’a. He classified Islamic sharia’a into two sets of rules: religious and legal. 
Sanhuri’s idea were based on the historical classification of sharia’a into rules 
governing relations between people and relations with God. The parts that are 
related to relations with God are the rules of faith that cannot be challenged or 
changed by any legal rule.45 On the other hand, the legal rules that organize the 
relationship between people is the core of Islamic sharia’a that are incorporated 
in comparative and legal work.46 Sanhuri emphasized the formulation of Islamic 
sharia’a into a large source of law by separating the religious from the secular.47 
Sanhuri’s belief was made clearer in his speech before the Egyptian Senate on 
the introduction of the new civil code. He emphasized the point that the 
application of the new civil code representing Islamic law was inherited from 
within and maintained sharia’a role in its application.   
 
Later on, Sanhuri promoted the inclusion of Islamic sharia’a in the application of 
the civil code in several respects.48 First, Islamic sharia’a was to be the judge’s 
tool in solving civil cases in the event of the code silence for an applicable rule. 
The judge could extract a general rule from Islamic sharia’a to be applied in such 
cases. It is akin to Roman law which acted as an open legal source for the 
judiciary in the event of textual absence. 
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Secondly, there are a lot of legal terms used in the civil code which correspond to 
terms in Islamic sharia’a, however, the new terms carried particular meanings 
and understandings by the Sanhuri committee, to be clarified in the illustrative 
drafts, such as explaining customary rules , or al-‘urf, or the ownership rights, or 
hu’quq al-melkya, through Islamic opinions.49 He included in his landmark 
textbook about the sources of right a comparative study between Islamic law and 
Western law, with emphasis on the existence of civil rights in the Islamic sharia’a 
compatible with Western legislation.50 Even those legal rules or articles 
originating directly from foreign legal systems could be linked jurisprudentially to 
Islamic sharia’a whereby they can be applied in a very wide sense, and not be 
bound by certain schools or madhab,51 or certain categories whether Sunni or 
Shiite schools’, all schools are considered as equal sources of the new 
application of the law.52 
This new version of the civil code, which includes Islamic sharia’a principles, was 
considered an Egyptianizing of the civil code. It solved the problem of the dual 
nature of the preceding civil code as existing between the Egyptian and the 
French legal systems. The Senate’s chairperson commented on the new civil 
code which would solve the judicial problem: 
The Egyptian judge was entitled to deal with both the Egyptian civil code 
and the French civil code that when he targets any problem he need to 
return back to French code to find an interpretation or a solution. 53 
Sanhuri’s vision looked like a brilliant solution to Egyptian legal system problems. 
It was a very revolutionary vision which changed the legal system and adhered to 
Sanhuri’s wish. According to Sanhuri, the 1948 civil code was intended to create 
new legal thinking which would develop in the future in consistency with Egyptian 
culture.  
C. Conclusion: 
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The Egyptian state evolved from the classical application of Islamic law into a 
more modernized system by the end of the nineteenth century. There were 
different approaches to modernity, but it was largely based on the ideas of 
modernist religious thinkers such as Abdou, Tahtawi and Sanhuri. This 
mechanism utilized Islamic principles themselves to develop the legal system 
and modernize it. From these principles takhayur and talfiq were used as 
grounds for modernization. It was necessary due to existing weaknesses in the 
legal system and political interference from Western states which accelerated it.  
III. Dilemma of Application of Islamic Sharia’a Principles 
The application of Islamic law principles in the modernization process of the 
Egyptian legal system, especially the use of takhayur and talfiq, produced an 
unexpected hybrid system. The Islamic sharia’a legal system is different in 
structure and philosophy from a modern positivist one. This hybrid system has 
led to uncertainty in actual legal practice. 
With the spread of this new ideology crowned by the approval of the modern civil 
code in 1948,54 an extended dialogue about the nature and identity of the new 
legal system and whether it was primarily Islamic or a modern Western one 
ensued. Because each ideology had its proponents, the political system 
benefited by tilting the policies towards one of the ideologies or the other as 
politically required.55 Despite the incorporation of both ideologies within the legal 
system, neither was ever clearly identified even after the 1980 amendment of 
constitutional article 2 which transformed Islamic sharia’a principles into the 
principal source of legislation. 
Most legal thinkers questioned whether the current Egyptian legal system was 
purely Islamic or purely modern even with the usage of takhayur and talfiq 
techniques which allowed temporary social acceptance of the new legal system. 
This chapter clarifies why the usage of takhayur and talfiq have not led to an 
Islamic legal system and explores the unexpected problems of application. 
A. Takhayur And Talfiq Did Not Create An Islamic Legal System 
 
There are several reasons why takhayur and talfiq have not led to the creation of 
an Islamic legal system. These reasons are based on fundamental differences 
between the Islamic legal system and the modern legal system. Differences in 
the essential features of each model of law have led to the ongoing inability to 
create such a modern Islamized legal system.  
1. The First Difference: Takhayur and Talfiq by State 
Instead of Individuals. 
 
The first difference between the Islamic legal system and the modern legal 
system is the replacement of the role of the ordinary layperson with the state in 
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the application of takhayur and talfiq. Takhayur and talfiq tools were justified 
historically for use by the ordinary layperson, because he/she was not qualified 
jurisprudentially to deduce the legal rule.56 Within a system of multi-
jurisprudential application, it was necessary to choose which legal opinion was to 
be applied from the different schools. At the same time, each Islamic school had 
its own system of analysis of the religious texts which produced different legal 
outcomes. Even with common reasoning grounds among schools, legal rules or 
ahkam shara’ya differed considerably between these schools.57The layperson 
thus faced different opinions with the authority to choose among them which is 
takhayur. The layperson was able to mix those opinions by also employing talfiq, 
which is predictable and justifiable because of the layperson’s assumed 
ignorance of the various sharia’a schools’ ideologies. 
Islamic law is based on the superiority of divine law; and divine law is 
represented by the Quran and prophetic sayings or hadiths. Thus, it is necessary 
to interpret these texts in order to realize and follow God’s revelation.58 
Interpretation, as was mentioned above, is based on each schools’ methodology 
of deduction. Historically, it has been almost impossible to limit legal application 
of one religious school verdicts over others. To solve such a dilemma, Islamic 
doctrine created several principles to regulate the application of schools’ opinions 
amongst the jurists and the u’lama such as al-Ijtihad la yazol bil Ijtihad, or no 
jurists’ ijtihad can be overthrown by another jurists’ one. And to regulate the 
multi-existence of schools amongst ordinary laypersons who did not follow a 
certain school, the Islamic doctrine accepted principles such as takhayur and 
talfiq.59  
On the other hand, the modern legal system whereby state authority presides 
over the legislative authority does not recognize the superiority of divine law. 
Despite this fact, the state itself is entitled to act on behalf of ordinary laypersons 
and utilize takhayur and talfiq and thus characterizing the system as being 
modern at its core.60 This substitution of the state for the layperson, which was 
suggested by such thinkers as Abdou and Al-Sanhuri, was originally intended to 
relieve the tension between the Islamic and Western application of law. But in 
reality it changed the importance and focus of the techniques. Takhayur and 
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talfiq were applied by the ordinary layperson to reconcile conflicting decisions 
between different schools’ opinions.61 Usage of the same techniques by the state 
were meant to avoid social clash, and to widen state authority over legislation. In 
other words, the usage of takhayur and talfiq changed from being a tool for 
resolving personal tensions between schools to a tool for distracting people from 
state policies.   
To clarify the problem of the substitution of the state for the ordinary layperson, it 
is useful to understand the schools’ methodology for deciding on the applicable 
legal rule. Madhabs, in the traditional Islamic system, state the means of 
deduction for the accurate understanding of religious texts in order to achieve the 
will of God.62 Sources of religious texts are both the Quran and the prophet’s 
sayings or hadiths. The Quran’s textual accuracy is generally agreed upon; it is 
not the same with the hadiths. Due to the late recording and collecting of the 
Prophet’s sayings, elements of fabrication interfered in the texts of hadiths. 
Accordingly each school had to verify its methodology to differentiate the genuine 
sayings from the fake ones. For example, the Hanafite School defines certain 
qualifications for the hadith tellers. If any of these qualifications are absent, the 
authenticity of the saying is doubted and its legal impact voided. For these 
reasons, the Hanafite School considers the prophetic hadith concerning the 
conditionality of marriage through the custodian as being doubtful because of the 
non-fulfillment of the conditions of its teller, Al-Sayda Aa’esha, who allowed a 
woman to marry in the absence of her custodian. This is because one of the 
requirements when considering the truth of the hadith is that the teller worked in 
consistency with it all his life, which was not fulfilled by Al-Sayda Aa’esha 
according to the Hanafites. However the Hanafite School does not deny the right 
of the custodian to approve or disapprove of a marriage based on other 
sayings.63 The same prophetic saying of Al-Sayda Aa’esha is recognized by 
other schools, which requires absolute custodian approval when considering the 
validity of a marriage contract. So, each school deduces its own legal rules 
based on its own judgment regarding the authenticity of the Prophet’s sayings. 
In modern family law, the state has approved through the takhayur mechanism 
the legal rule of the Hanafite School whereby a custodian is not required to fulfill 
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the marriage contract of a woman.64 At the same time it ignores the 
complementary Hanafite School’s opinions concerning the right of the custodian 
to disapprove of the marriage. The law limited such right of the custodian to 
disapprove of the marriage only for minor women in contradiction with Hanafite 
doctrine which allows the disapproval of custodian for both adult and minor 
women.65 And in other cases, it relies on another school’s opinion, such as the 
Maliki, when considering the right of women to self-divorce based on harm, which 
is contrary to the Hanafite School’s position. This type of talfiq among different 
schools which is based on interpreting the same texts depending on its 
authenticity, creates the law that organizes marriage laws in Egypt. Here, the 
state utilizes both takhayur and talfiq to achieve legal outcomes different from the 
traditional Islamic application, in spite of its roots in Islamic jurisprudence. 
Whereby the valid talfiq was traditionally required to maintain the consistency of 
the legal outcome of each school’s opinion, it is not required by modern laws or 
even represented there.66 This makes the usage of takhayur and talfiq 
methodologies very different from the traditional application, whether for the 
purpose of application or establishing conditions for validity. In other words, 
takhayur and talfiq are used as a method for justification rather than as a legal 
mechanism for the new legal system. Even modern religious institutions such as 
dar el’ e’ftaa’ which approve wider usage of the principle of takhayur, maintains 
its silence about the usage of talfiq by the state in such a manner.  
2. Takhayur and Talfiq have not led to Singularity in 
Legal Answer 
 
The second difference between the Islamic and modern legal systems is the 
singularity of the legal answer. The application of takhayur and talfiq within 
different jurisdictions reflects the plurality of the Islamic legal system, while the 
modern state is supposed to have a single legal system with a single legal 
authority. According to this modern positivist understanding of the singularity of 
the legal answer, there have been attempts to codify doctrines of one of the 
Islamic schools to present an equivalent unified system. A well-known attempt 
was the codification of the Hanafite School in Al-Majalla al-ahkam al-‘adliyya, or 
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the Magazine of Justice Rules, by the Ottoman state.67 The Ottoman sultan 
ordered a committee headed by Ahmet Jevdet, the Turkish nationalist and legal 
thinker, to codify the Hanafite doctrine. The application of Al-Majalla al-ahkam al-
‘adliyya, or the Magazine of Justice Rules was widely criticized for being a very 
selective codification, which neglected the jurisprudential grounds of the other 
schools. It forced jurists, judges and lawyers, who were convinced of Al-Majalla’s 
inaccuracy, to consider the same legal texts along with other schools’ opinions. A 
common starting point was the application of Article no. 16 of the Al-Majalla 
which stated that “no ijtihad can be overthrown by another equivalent ijtihad”. The 
judges and jurists widen its scope of application by considering al-Majalla articles 
as an ijtihad and equivalent to other schools’ ijtihad, keeping the application of all 
schools parallel to al-Majalla.68 This was the case with forum legislation which 
ended with the failure of the Ottoman state and the issuance of new national 
laws. Most new civil laws in Arab countries were influenced by the Egyptian civil 
code and Al-Sanhuri’s ideas. This application of taqlid, which is takhayur of a 
single school’s opinions as a source of codification failed in achieving legal 
stability. Talfiq between schools lead to the first difference between Islamic and 
modern laws by not ensuring the shared legal outcome of different schools.69 
The codification of one school of Islam did not solve the problem. Al-Majalla’s 
representing only the Hanafite School in accordance with the political order of the 
Ottoman state gained extensive criticism by ignoring the rest of the Islamic 
doctrines. At the same time the problems associated with applying different 
schools’ doctrines also prevented the full embrace of Islamic legal thinking.  
3. The Divinity Of Legislation 
The third difference between the Islamic and modern laws is the divinity feature. 
Islamic law is based on the divinity of the legal rule. It requires deep understand 
of religious texts, such as the Quran and hadiths, as the grounds and main 
source of Islamic teachings and sharia’a. Accordingly, what is stated directly in 
the religious texts cannot be ignored, changed or substituted. But the Islamic 
schools and madhabs reached different understandings of the same religious 
texts based on an understanding of the texts’ authenticity and place within 
Islamic history.70 Quranic verses are interpreted in conformity with two factors, 
                                                          
67 Supra note 22. 
68 Supra note 22. 
69 Supra note 2. 
70 See supra note 1. 
III. DILEMMA OF APPLICATION 
24 
 
asbab el-nzool or the historic occasion of the text creation, in addition to the 
Prophet’s sayings. These two features determine the application of the Quranic 
texts. The recognized Islamic principle is that the u’lama or scholars’ findings, in 
and of themselves, are not divine in nature. Stated as kulun yoa’khaz a’lyh wa 
yurad ila Allah w rasuluhu, this means that every scholar’s findings can be 
criticized and refuted except for God’s and the Prophet’s.71 The legitimacy of the 
scholars’ opinions came out of their connection with the Quran or hadiths through 
either the mechanism of al-qias or ijmaa’. In qias or deduction, scholars try to 
deduce the applicable legal rule from a similarly stated verdict. For example, 
alcoholic drinks are prohibited in the Malikite School because they lead to 
drunkenness. This rule is deduced from the wine or Khamr drinking prohibition in 
Quranic verse, as the reason behind wine’s prohibition is drunkenness, which 
can be extended to other alcoholic beverages.72 Ijmaa’ or consensus legacy, 
whereby an agreement between scholars is essential, is based on the prophetic 
hadith stating that Muslims must never consent to wrongfulness or falseness.73 In 
this way each legal rule is related in one way or another to the divinity of texts as 
the source of legitimacy. This is unlike the modern legal rules which are justified 
on more secular grounds. Modern laws are justified as being representative of 
people’s will, or reflective of state authority, or even sometimes the natural 
understanding of justice. All of these reasons separate the divine from the 
profane. Even considering Islamic law as a general source of law, according to 
Al-Sanhuri’s model, will not forfeit the modern feature of laws as being Islamic. It 
is similar to relying on historic legal culture, whether Islamic or not depending on 
each legal school’s position.74 Where modern laws accept takhayur and talfiq as 
comparative legal tools in order to develop the legal system, there is no 
overriding religious umbrella for the legal outcome. 
B. Unprecedented Results of Takhayur and Talfiq Application. 
 
Takhayur and talfiq application led to unprecedented and unexpected results, 
which often contradict with the purpose of their usage in the legal system. The 
engineer and designer of the new Egyptian civil code, Al-Sanhuri, intended to 
create a modern legal system like that of other European states especially that of 
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France. But Al-Sanhuri, who was both a nationalist and a socialist, believed that 
sources of civil code should not contradict national culture and society. He 
supported lower classes in the civil code by borrowing legal rules from Islamic 
sharia’a such as waqf and al-uluu wal-sufull.75 He then delineated a hierarchy of 
four legal sources comprised of written legal texts, custom, Islamic sharia’a 
principles, and rules of justice and equity. In his attempt at positivism, Sanhuri 
elevated legal text over all other forms of legal rules, using custom as the second 
source which was similar to other Western laws in the event of textual gaps. The 
most controversial work of Sanhuri’s was his identifying Islamic sharia’a as the 
third source after custom and before the rules of equity and justice.76 Order was 
strictly enforced. If a written text was absent, a judge is obliged to rely on custom, 
Islamic sharia’a, or rules of equity and justice in that order. Considering that 
Roman law was the general legal source of law in Europe, Sanhuri tried to place 
the Islamic sharia’a in a similar position. Accordingly, Islamic sharia’a would not 
be applied by its schools or opinions. Just the selected rules by legislative 
authority would be applied to the legal texts. In the event there were no texts or 
customs to rely on, a judge would be allowed to search Islamic sharia’a for the 
applicable rule. In this way, Islamic sharia’a served as a pool of rules, which the 
legislative and judicial authorities could pick from as needed.77 
Sanhuri and the other modernist thinkers heavily debated the civil code and its 
Islamicity. Sanhuri defended the Islamicity of the new code seeing it as 
representing the will of the divine, especially on the basis of the takhayur and 
talfiq techniques. Under the new understanding brought by Abdou and Tahtawi, 
the takhayur and talfiq tools could be used by state authority. Al-Sanhuri 
defended the new civil code against accusations of Westernization. This was 
rejected by Qadri Pasha,78 who tried to issue an alternative draft law by codifying 
Hanafite school doctrine similar to Al-Majalla al-a’dlia. But Sanhuri, between 
1933 and 1948, succeeded in convincing the legislative authority and the legal 
elite through his writings and advocacy that the new draft of the law was Islamic. 
This success ended the debate about other alternatives to the new civil code.79 In 
the following years, with the explicit and implicit understanding of lawyers, judges 
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and jurists about the Islamicity of the newly adopted modern system, the new 
system operated on hybrid grounds. 
Unexpectedly, the actual application of the new hybrid system did not follow the 
expected trajectory of Sanhuri’s ideas that the new civil code would deepen 
modernity in the legal system. On the contrary, the legal system, through its 
hybrid nature, produced a new form of legal plurality combining Islamic and 
modern laws and increasing the uncertainty of legal rules’ application. It also 
forced the lawyers, judges and legislators to adopt regressive thinking about the 
legal system.   
1. Undecided Position For Sharia’a And Modern Laws 
The legal system’s hybrid nature was intended to resolve the contradiction 
between modernist and Islamic legal systems. But the tension between the 
supposed superiority of the legal rule over divine law affected legal thinkers and 
practitioners. Judges, lawyers and jurists were accustomed to interpreting legal 
texts by drawing on Islamic opinions. Even Sanhuri himself was used to 
interpreting the civil code articles through Islamic sharia’a and fiqh texts.80 Such a 
methodology of interpretation directed the judicial attention to a different 
interpretation of law. Courts interpreted legal texts in consistency with traditional 
fiqh which could contradict with the legislative purposes of the text. Of course this 
was not the case for all legal rules but, theoretically speaking, legal texts 
complement each other. Thus, preferring certain texts over others lead to 
changes to the entire outcome of law. 
For example, one of the later modern jurists, Haraga, explained that concluding 
marriage contracts for girls under eighteen years of age is valid with the approval 
of the custodian, even if it is not authenticated by an official registrar. He 
interpreted the family law marriage age of 18 years as a limitation, but it did not 
negate the marriage contract itself as long as it maintained the same sharia’a 
conditions such as the widow payment, acceptance of parties and declaration of 
the marriage contract. Accordingly, a minor woman marrying is still a legal 
marriage despite its contradicting criminal and family laws. Family law gives the 
marriage age as eighteen years to be valid, and criminal law considers sexual 
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acts with minors as a sexual crime. Generally, this opinion is expressed in the 
current legal field through courts and lawyers.81  
2. Legal Uncertainty: 
Legal uncertainty is the second unexpected outcome of the new hybrid legal 
system. The modern legal system should state clearly a single legal answer, but 
this was not the case with the new system. Some Egyptian laws clearly identify 
the Islamic sharia’a as active modes of application, even clearer than the civil 
code. This is primarily found in personal status and family laws. Al-Sanhuri 
completely rejected the separation of the personal status code from the civil code 
considering it as a form of “code civique” ideology found in most modern states 
guaranteeing the rights of persons on the same grounds as the civil code.82 But 
in the Egyptian personal status code, the Hanafite School is explicitly stated as 
the applicable law for all family issues not included in the code. It is a clear 
example of the uncertainty of legal practice. To explain such uncertainty, we 
need to understand the court’s authority in establishing the applicable rule 
through the Hanafite doctrine. The problem with that application is that courts are 
bound by two sets of rules: the family code texts and the Hanafite doctrine in that 
order. The abbreviated code texts regulate a few types of family disputes, unlike 
the Hanafite doctrine which is very detailed and includes different Hanafite 
scholars’ opinions. Such practice lead to uncertainty and ignorance in the 
application of legal rules in the family disputes, given the difficulty in predicting 
the actual opinion applied by courts.83 
To understand the extension of the legal rules that could be applied within the 
personal status code which stated Hanafite doctrine as applicable during textual 
silence, it is important to recognize that the main Islamic schools such as the 
Hanafite School had many followers including jurists. Each of those jurists added 
their own opinions concerning the application of Islamic laws. The Hanafite 
doctrine includes also sub-doctrines of the subsequent jurists, who follow Abu 
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Hanifa doctrine. Such practice of the doctrine created a body of mainstream 
Hanafite doctrine that Hanafite jurists often consent upon, and a minor stream 
that stemmed from different legal opinions in each juristic case. There are the 
official verdicts of the Hanafite school of Abu-Hanifa - the school founder, and of 
the well-known followers such as Abu-Yusuf, and Muhammad Al‑Sheybani; their 
contribution is referred as masa’il al-usuliya or the main cases. Masa’il al-usuliya 
embodies the main Hanafite opinions for interpreting the Quran and hadiths. 
There is a second type of Hanafite doctrine which is known as masa’iI al-nawadir 
or the rare cases, which is composed of Hanafite opinions about rare cases that 
are not faced by the mainstream scholars.84 Also, there are writings of other 
Hanafite scholars that give legal opinions by following the Hanafite methodology 
of interpretation in cases. The decisive opinion amongst these various points of 
views is the judge’s, as the judge is the only authorized person to choose 
according to family law. Takhayur, in such an application, is practiced by the 
judge himself who is authorized to choose among all of the Hanafite doctrine, 
either from masa’il al-usuliya, masa’iI al-nawadir, or the other descendant’s 
writings. The judge may also do a sort of talfiq between different Hanafite 
opinions reaching a new legal outcome. All of these scenarios are legal and 
acceptable in the legal field, and accordingly the uncertainty of the legal 
application is found through the practice of law.85 
The other issue about these laws is that they represent takhayur and talfiq 
techniques broadly, because nearly every group of articles in family law 
represent an Islamic school. Egyptian family laws are not limited to the Sunni 
schools, but also include some rules derived from the Shiite schools.86 The most 
innovative example of talfiq here is the khul’, or self-divorce, which is based on a 
minority opinion in the Malikite School. This opinion gives women the right to self-
divorce with no restrictions on the husband’s agreement. The Khul’ rule has been 
widely debated as to whether it is Islamic or non-Islamic. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court decisions have avoided that claim as long as it is based on 
one of the madhabs’ opinions, which is a usage of the takhayur rule. The Khul’ 
legality was very controversial and not common among the Malikite scholars and 
represents a very minority opinion among the Malikite. Contrarily, the Egyptian 
legislator and in the judicial decisions considered it an Islamic derivative; the 
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opposition of such laws by radical Islamists and religious groups is based on the 
ignoring of the husband’s exclusive right in divorce according to the practice of 
traditional Islamic sharia’a. The problem with this debate is that it is considered to 
be the use of takhayur and talfiq to produce an Islamic version of law that can be 
discussed through its level of conformity with Islamic sharia’a, not as a modern 
law representing the state’s intent in achieving equality between men and women 
in marital contracts, and evaluated accordingly.  
3. Contradictory Positions Between State Courts And 
Parliamentary Figures  
Although even modern laws are uncertain, the traditional uncertainty regarding 
Islamic laws is accompanied by a problem in identifying the applicable rule. 
Relating laws to Islamic sharia’a does not separate the application of law from 
fiqh texts, creating additional ambiguity or even derailing the legal texts by un-
written fiqh opinions.  
Although the Court of Cassation has mentioned in its ruling that stating Islamic 
sharia’a as the primary source of legislation in the Egyptian constitution is 
directed towards the Egyptian parliament which is responsible for editing and 
issuing laws, it is not the same position for the constitutional court. It has found 
several rulings unconstitutional based on their non-conformity to Islamic sharia’a 
as stated in the second constitutional article.  
This is true even at the legislative level. In 1985, Mumtaz Nassar, who was a 
member of the Egyptian parliament, encouraged parliament members to proceed 
with the Islamization of the legislation hinting that: 
Since 1976, the majilis al-sha’b (Egyptian parliament), began the 
preparation of studies with the formation of committees and gathering 
materials, a number of the studies which… [Concerned] legislating the 
sharia’a in all the texts of the present laws.87 
As we see, Islamic sharia’a’s position in the modern legal system is not clear, 
and Islamic preference is not based on a practical or legal basis, but rather on 
the sense of its obligation to sharia’a principles. This thinking includes Egyptian 
courts, which also experience a similar ambiguity to that of the French application 
of the civil code in the nineteenth century. There, judges and lawyers accepted 
the application of legal rules without ignoring Christian morality and theology. 
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Historically, such application by French courts was applied implicitly to avoid 
claims of illegality or unconstitutionality.  
C. Conclusion: 
The application of takhayur and talfiq as a mediation process to achieve an 
Islamized modern legal system has not achieved the expected goals due to the 
differences between the Islamic legal system and modern law, and the 
misunderstanding of the position of Islamic law texts in the modern legal system.  
The differences between the Islamic legal system and the modern legal system 
are about the nature of and sources of justification for each system, and 
differences in how takhayur and talfiq are used in both. As a modern legal 
system seeks the singularity of its rules, Islamic law is about the plurality of its 
jurisdictions. In addition to the different source of legitimacy between the Islamic 
and modern legal systems, Islamic law is about divinity and modern laws are 
legitimized through non-divine avenues. The making of legal rules in both 
systems are quite different. Accordingly, takhayur and talfiq were introduced into 
the Islamic legal system as logical methods to solve the matter of plurality. In 
modern law they are used more as tools for concealing modernity in Islamic form 
to be socially acceptable.  
The unprecedented problems that the creation of such a hybrid legal system 
entails has evaded the purposes of modernity in legal practice. Judges, jurists 
and lawyers faced problems in figuring out the nature of the legal system which 
increased the uncertainty of the legal practice. The hybridity of the legal system 
is also affected by the existence of Islamic schools in some laws, especially 
personal status and family law.  
IV. The Egyptian Constitutional Article 2 Position and Interpretation  
To gain a sense of the legal dilemma within the modern Egyptian legal system, 
which is hybrid in nature and suspended between modernity and traditionalism, 
the second constitutional article is a very good start. In the current constitution of 
Egypt,88 Article 2 states that “Islam is the religion of the state, Arabic its official 
language, and the principles of Islamic sharia’a are the principal (major) source 
of legislation”. This article was inserted into the Egyptian Constitution for historic, 
political and cultural reasons, and since its inclusion has generated additional 
ambiguity in the application of the law.  
This chapter begins with a brief historical background on the adoption of Article 
2. Then, an overview of the judicial decrees emanating from this constitutional 
article from both the Supreme Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation, 
and a hint at parliamentary and political positions from it is given. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the uncertainty created by inclusion of the Article 2 
in the Egyptian legal system. 
A. The Historical Background On The Adoption Of Article 2: 
Since the modernization of the Egyptian legal system, endless negotiations about 
the identity of that new legal system and the position of Islam and sharia’a within 
it has ensued. Western interference in Egypt, because of economic interests, 
increased the influence of modern European laws especially French and British. 
By 1882, British colonization had settled officially in Egypt as a controlling 
authority. The colonial authority worked on accelerating the creation of 
bureaucratic and modern state authorities. In 1883, legal decrees substituted for 
the 1882 constitution which had only been recently created prior to the British 
invasion. Attempts at changing the identity of the state from an Islamic province 
under the Ottoman state into a British province were clear. This change was 
neither popular nor readily accepted by Egyptian society, who looked at the 
British as both foreign and non-Muslim who threatened their new national 
identity.  
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By 1917, members of the Egyptian political and cultural elite claimed the right to 
represent the Egyptian people before the League of Nations to promote self-
determination. The claim of self-determination was not accepted by the British 
government, which lead to oppression of the political group known as al-Wafd or 
the Delegation.89 The al-Wafd group consisted mainly of legal figures such as 
lawyers Saa’d Zaghloul, Ahmed Lotfy El-Sayed, and Abdul-Aziz Fahmy, who 
later became a judge and the first head of the Court of Cassation. It was soon 
clear that this group was comprised merely of law professionals, who had a new 
liberal vision about the relationship between the state and the people.  
After the rejection of the independence claims, Egyptians began resisting 
colonialism culminating in the 1919 Revolution. This movement favored Egyptian 
nationalism consistent with an Islamic religious identity. Accordingly Christians 
and women participated in this Revolution on nationalist grounds. After declaring 
independence from Britain in 1922, a call for a new constitution was raised, and 
accepted by King Fouad. 
1. 1923 Constitution Position From Islamic Sharia’a: Article 
149 
The Egyptian elite claimed to have a modern liberal constitution like that of 
European nations. Accordingly the king of Egypt, Fouad, under pressure, 
accepted the formulation of a committee to write this constitution. In 1923 the 
constitution was created and signed by the king; it was the first operational 
constitution in Egypt.90 
Article 149 of the 1923 Constitution stated that “Islam is the religion of the state, 
and Arabic language is the official language.” This article was agreed upon by 
the formulating committee with no objections, even from its non-Muslim 
members. It shifted state identity from being an informal understanding to the 
highest and most formal legal document. Article 149 was an attempt to place the 
issue of the Islamicity of the state alongside its nationality, through the same 
hybrid model of thinking which joined modernity with Islamicity. Essentially, Egypt 
was a state in the modern sense, but identified with Islam. This Article was 
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maintained in the subsequent Egyptian Constitutions of 1930, 1956 and 1964. 
While the Constitutions of 1923 and 1930 were adopted through a royal decree 
with no referendum, the 1956 Constitution was adopted by referendum under 
Nasser’s authority; and the 1964 Constitution was declared by presidential 
decree as a temporary constitution after the dissolution of the Arab Republic - the 
union between Egypt and Syria. Only the 1958 Constitution, which was the Arab 
Republic temporary Constitution, ignored article 149. There was no clear 
outcome from adopting Article 149 in any of these constitutions, or even in its 
omission in the 1958 constitution.  
2. 1971 Constitution To The Current 2012 Constitution Which 
was Broadly Amended In the 2014 Referendum  
 
The 1971 Constitution included the same article number 149 in the 1923 
Constitution, placing it as the second article of the new constitution, and 
modifying it with the addition of the words “and the Islamic sharia’a is a principal 
source of its legislation.” 
Some analysts claim that this new wording was connected to the political tension 
existing between leftists groups who favored Nasserist policies and President 
Sadat whose policies were considered to be against state socialism. Due to this 
tension, Sadat tried to deal with Islamic religious groups, who were oppressed 
under Nasser’s authority, by supporting them against leftists. Part of that deal 
was the modification of Article number 149 to include Islamic principles as a main 
source of legislation.91Egyptian authorities depended on Islamic groups to 
support, justify and popularize state decisions. This support was based on claims 
of the Islamicity of the Egyptian state, society and regime. Even Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat was called a president of faith.  
Tension between the Islamic movements and the state cannot be isolated from 
the nature of decisions taken by the state. For example, Islamic movements did 
not show support for the historic peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. On the 
contrary, in 1980 they supported the presidential referendum amending Article 2 
to state that “the principles of Islamic sharia’a are the principal source of 
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legislation.”92 This emphasis on Islamic sharia’a principles was interpreted by 
political groups as transforming the modern legal system into one inspired by 
Islamic sharia’a in all respects. Tragically, Sadat was assassinated by one of the 
Islamic extremist groups at the end of 1980, which disallowed him from benefiting 
from that deal amending Article 77.93 
B. Interpretation of Article 2: 
The amendment of Article 2, in 1980 led to questions about the new meaning 
and application of Islamic sharia’a within the legal system. This was interpreted 
differently by politicians in the Egyptian parliament, Court of Cassation and 
Supreme Constitutional Court.  
 
1. Political Point Of View In The Egyptian Parliament 
Some parliamentary figures, especially with Islamic affiliations, such as Mumtaz 
Nassar, believed that this amendment to article 2 should be followed by more 
extensive revisions of legal texts to ensure the application of Islamic sharia’a. 
Accordingly, parliament saw additional proposals for new Islamic codes, but 
these new codes were never realized.94 
Rifat Mahjub, the head of the People’s Assembly in 1985, tried to re-open the 
debate on Islamic codes that had been prepared by the preceding assembly 
under Sufi Abu-Talib, but the governing party, the National Democratic Party, 
rejected by a majority such a motion and thus ending it for all.95 
The official religious institutions represented by U’lama’ Al-Azhar, surprisingly 
proposed action against the government’s position regarding the interpretation 
and application of the new constitutional article. They claimed that the 
government was not serious about applying the new constitutional text, and thus 
denied the direct application of Islamic sharia’a. In the end, they also failed to 
impose their understanding of sharia’a on state authorities. 96 
In the end, neither the political nor religious institutions’ position was able to 
resolve the legal issue surrounding the application of Article 2 in the legal 
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system. It was more connected to the sense of Islamic nationalism than actual 
legal practice. 
2. The Court Of Cassation Interpretation of Article 2 
It is important to begin a discussion of Court of Cassation’s interpretation of 
article 2, in recognizing it as the highest juridical entity in the Egyptian judicial 
system since its creation in the first half of the twentieth century. Accordingly, the 
Court of Cassation was entitled, in general, to interpret laws and exercise its 
authority over claims of unconstitutionality. But due to the absence of legal 
procedures to decide the unconstitutionality, the Court of Cassation did not 
exceed its interpretation authority. By the 1970s, the Supreme Court challenged 
the legal texts as being unconstitutional, succeeded by the Supreme 
Constitutional Court in 1979. During the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, the 
jurisdiction of both the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Constitutional Court 
over interpreting constitutional texts remained unclear.  
When considering the position of the Court of Cassation during the period 
following the 1980’s amendment of article 2, a lot of Islamist lawyers, who were 
supported by a number of judges, raised court motions claiming the 
unconstitutionality of laws in accordance with Article 2. In response, judges 
stopped deciding those cases, and referred them to the Supreme Constitutional 
Court to address first the unconstitutionality claims. 97  
Some of these claims of unconstitutionality reached the Court of Cassation, 
which found itself obliged to make a decision. In Cassation Appeal no. 7846 for 
the judicial year no. 58, a claim regarding the application of article no. 7 in the 
Egyptian penal code was raised. Article no. 7 in the Egyptian penal code states 
that “Penal law shall not diminish the personal rights in accordance with Islamic 
sharia’a. “98 The plaintiff claimed the right of the accused to punish his family 
members in accordance with Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution and Article 7 
of penal code, claiming that the court’s decision of imprisonment was based on a 
misinterpretation of constitutional Article 2.  
 
Accordingly, the Court of Cassation was entitled to respond to such a claim. The 
problem encountered by the Court was that there was no precedent 
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interpretation of Article 2 by the Court of Cassation or the Supreme Constitutional 
Court. The Court of Cassation held the duty to interpret Article 2 for the first time 
after the amendment of 1980. It stated in its verdict of 18 January 1990 that 
Article 2 is just an opportunity for the legislator to consider Islamic sharia’a, with 
no further obligation on the Egyptian courts to apply sharia’a: 
Article 2 of Egyptian constitution about considering Islamic sharia’a as 
the principal source of legislation is an invitation for the legislator to 
ensure the application of Islamic sharia’a in the laws issued through its 
authority […] and it should be represented within legal texts issued 
through legislative authority to be executed by judicial authorities… 
Accordingly Islamic sharia’a shouldn’t be applied by the essence of 
article 2, in itself, unless legislative authority stated it into laws.99 
 
In this court decision, the Court of Cassation considered Article 2 as an invitation 
for the legislator to apply Islamic sharia’a. The Court of Cassation supported the 
application of legal texts over Islamic sharia’a principles, deciding that the only 
way to apply sharia’a was through adoption of it through legislation.  
In another case, Cassation Appeal no. 1089 of the judicial year no. 57, the Court 
of Cassation forfeited deciding a claim of unconstitutionality of a civil code article. 
The claim was in regards to Article 226 of the civil code which allowed up to four 
percent interest on the payment of debts. The plaintiff claimed contradiction 
between this article and Islamic sharia’a and Article 2. On the 8th of January 
1990, the Court of Cassation issued its verdict. Similar to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court position, it stated that legislation prior to the adoption of the 
new Article 2 was valid and applicable. It rejected the claims of unconstitutionality 
of these laws as the new Article 2 should be applied to legislation only by giving 
the legislator a chance to amend older legislation.100 
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ذيفنتلا لاجم يلإ اهلقنت ةطبضنمو ةددحم ةيعيرشت صوصن يف. 
 ام ناك امل سيل عيرشتلل يسيئرلا ردصملا ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ئدابم نأ نم هنم ةيناثلا ةداملا يف روتسدلا هيلع صن
 نمو . نيناوق نم هنسي اميف ايسيئر اردصم ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ذختي يك عراشلل ةوعد يه امنإ هتاذب لامعلإا بجاو
ع ليوعتلاب قيبطتلا ةبجاو نوكت لا ةعيرشلا كلت ماكحأ نإف مث عراشلا باجتسا اذإ لاإ هيلإ راشملا روتسدلا صن يل
ذيفنتلاو لمعلا لاجم يلإ اهلقنت ةطبضنمو ةددحم ةيعيرشت صوصن يف ماكحلأا هذه غرفأو هتوعدل”. 
100 See Appeal no. 8081 for the Juridical year 57, Court of Cassation, 8th of 
January 1990, vol.41, at 137: “ داملا يف صنلاملا ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا نأ ىلع روتسدلا نم ةيناثلا ة ردص
ئرلا ردصملا ةعيرشلا هذه نوكت نأب عراشلل ىوعد وه امنإ هتاذب لامعلإا بجاو سيل .عيرشتلل يسيئرلا اميف يسي
يف هتوعدل عراشلا ةباجتسا ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ماكحأ قيبطت يف طانملا نإف مث نمو نيناوق نم هعضي ئدابم غارفإ اه
لا ةطلسلا هددحت يذلا خيراتلا نم ًاءدب اهماكحأ لامعإب ءاضقلا مزلي يتلا نيناوقلا صوصن يف ءاحمسلا ةيعرش
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Surprisingly, the Court of Cassation assumed a different position in Cassation 
Appeal no. 1800 for the juridical year no 61. It analyzed Article 29 of lease law 
no. 49 for the year 1977, on the Islamicity claim. The Court interpreted lease 
contracts based on fiqh and sharia’a, justifying the application of the legal text as 
not contradicting Islamic sharia’a as follows: 
[…] the second article of constitution stated that “the principles of Islamic 
sharia’a are the principal source of legislation’, and as article no. 29 of 
law no. 1977 regarding leasing places stated that among beneficiaries of 
the article, including the lessee parents, the condition of keep staying 
within the leased unit by the original lessee till death or acquittal, and 
what is meant by staying in this legal context is the staying for a  legal 
cause with no contradiction with Islamic sharia’a rulings.101 
Apparently, the Court of Cassation in this ruling extended interpretation of legal 
texts through an understanding of Islamic sharia’a. But it was not the final 
position of the Court. It would be influenced by a later interpretation of a decision 
by the Supreme Constitutional Court reinterpreting Article 2 on new grounds.102 
The Court of Cassation declared its commitment to principles of Islamic sharia’a 
which are certain in authenticity and meaning as being notable in its verdict: 
[A]s this court followed its stable jurisdiction, [that applying article 2 of the 
Egyptian constitution], it may not be issued any legal text under its 
jurisdiction that violate the decisive certain rules of Islamic sharia’a, that 
is certain in authenticity and meaning, because of such certainty Ijtihad is 
forbidden as such certain rules of Islamic sharia’a represent its essence 
that could not be changed nor reinterpreted, But other rules of Islamic 
sharia’a that is not certain in its authenticity or meaning, are allowed for 
                                                                                                                                                
شإ نيبو يعضولا نوناقلا قيبطتب ءاضقلا مازتلا نيب طلخلا ىلإ ىدؤي كلذ ريغب لوقلاو ،اهنايرسل دعاوقلا عارت
رظنلا اذه دكؤيو ،هتيلاو دودح عم ىبأتت يتلا ةينوناقلا ا تاطلسلا ددح دق يرصملا روتسدلا ناك امل هنأ ةيروتسدل
حلإ زوجي لا هنأ همزلا امم يروتسدلا ماظنلا ماوق وه تاطلسلا نيب لصفلا ناكو اهنم لك صاصتخا حضوأو نأ اهاد
يبطت هماكحأ قفو ةيئاضقلا ةطلسلا ةفيظو تناكو ،ىمسلأا نوناقلا هرابتعإب روتسدلا هررق ام زواجت نيناوقلا ق
ا ةداملا نإف كلذ نع ًلاضفو ،اهماكحأ لامعإ اهيلع نيعتي هنإف ةيراسل191  هتررق ام لك نأ ىلع صنت روتسدلا نم
يدعت وأ اهؤاغلإ زوجي كلذ عمو ًاذفانو ًاحيحص ىقبي روتسدلا اذه رودص لبق ماكحأ نم حئاوللاو نيناوقلا ًاقفو اهل
روتسدلا اذه يف ةررقملا تاءارجلإاو دعاوقلل" 
ث نموئدابم ننقت مل ةيعيرشتلا ةطلسلا نأ ماد ام ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ماكحأب يدحتلل انه لاجم لا هنإف م عيرشت يف اه
ةسلجب تضق دق ايلعلا ةيروتسدلا ةمكحملا تناكو كلذ ناك امل يعضو4/5/1985  صن ةيروتسد مدع ىوعد ضفرب
 ةداملا226 سرلا ةديرجلا يف مكحلا اذه رشنو يندملا نوناقلا نم خيراتب ةيم16/5/1985 مكحلا ءاضق ىرج ذإو ،
 نيتداملا صنل رادهإ نم هيلإ ىهتنا اميف فنأتسملا مكحلا دييأت ىلع كلذ مغر هيف نوعطملا226 ،227  نوناقلا نم
نإف ،عيرشتلل ًايسيئر ًاردصم روتسدلا اهربتعا يتلا ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ماكحأ عم امهضراعتل يندملا دق نوكي ه “ فلاخ
اقلاهقيبطت يف أطخأو نون  
101See Appeal no. 1800 for the Juridical year 61, Court of Cassation,12th of April 
1998, vol.49, at 306: “ يملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ئدابم............." نأ ىلع تصن دق روتسدلا نم ةيناثلا ةداملا ة
داملا نم ىلولأا ةرقفلا طرتشتو ،"عيرشتلل يسيئرلا ردصملا ة29  نوناقلا نم49  ةنسل1977  نكاملأا راجيإ نأشب
 نادلاولا مهنيب نمو ينوناقلا دادتملاا ةزيمب نيديفتسملا نم مهتددع نميف- اب ةرقتسملا ةمئادلا ةماقلإا نم ةرجؤملا نيعل
غوسم ىلإ ةدنتسملا ةماقلإا ىنعملا اذه يف ةماقلإاب دوصقملاو ،كرتلا وأ ةافولا ىتح يلصلأا رجأتسملا ق لا ينونا
ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ماكحأ فلاخي”. 
102 Supra note 91. 
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ijtihad process…[ as it is allowed] it will be allowed for wali al-amr for the 
beneficiary of society103 
The Court here referred to several terms representing a new understanding by 
the Court of Cassation of Article 2, and sharia’a. The state is considered as waly 
al-amr or the governor, in the Islamic context, and is entitled to do Ijtihad through 
courts and legislative authorities. The areas of Ijtihad, according to that verdict, 
are the uncertain areas of Islamic sharia’a whether its authenticity or meaning. 
Those uncertain areas were not identified by the verdicts of the Court of 
Cassation but rather through the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
3. Supreme Constitutional Court Interpretation Of Article 2: 
The Supreme Constitutional Court, which was established to substitute for the 
Supreme Court through law no. 48 for 1979,104 is entitled to conduct judicial 
monitoring of the constitutionality of jurisdictions and regulations, to decide on 
court jurisdiction competency amongst different judicial authorities, and to decide 
the validity of judicial verdicts in event of the existence of two contradicting 
judicial verdicts from different judicial organs regarding the same issue.105 Law 
no. 48 of 1979 never stated clearly the authority of the court to interpret the 
constitution articles in themselves, but it was understood from the legal 
jurisdiction that it required interpretation of the constitutional article before 
deciding on the constitutional claims. 
a. First Interpretation of Article 2 Before The 
Amendment Of 1980: 
Under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the 1970s, questions of 
constitutionality arose regarding the second article of the Constitution. Article 2 
before its 1980 amendment stated that “Islamic sharia’a is a principal source of 
legislation.” The Supreme Court in its 1976 verdict interpreted the second 
                                                          
103See Appeal no. 70 for the Juridical year 18, Supreme Constitutional Court, 3rd 
of November 2002, vol.10, at 682:  “ يف اهليدعت دعب روتسدلا نم ةيناثلا ةداملا يف صنلا نأ كلذ  ماع
1980 ا ئدابم" نأ ىلعه ءاضق هيلع ىرج ام ىلعو ،لدي ،"عيرشتلل يسيئرلا ردصملا ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشل هذ
وبث يف ةيعطقلا ةيعرشلا ماكحلأا ضقاني نأ هلظ يف ردصي يعيرشت صنل زوجي لا هنأ ىلع ،ةمكحملا اهتللادو اهت
ةعيرشلا نم لثمت اهنلأ اهيف داهتجلإا عنتمي يتلا يه اهدحو ماكحلأا هذه نأ رابتعإب ،اعم تباوث ةيملاسلإا لا يتلا اه
ي داهتجلإا باب نإف ،اعم امهيف وأ اهتللادو اهتوبث يف ةيعطقلا ريغ ماكحلأا امأ ،لايدبت وأ لايوأت لمتحت اهيف عست
 لهأ نم ابودنمو ازئاج ناك نإ داهتجا وهو ،دابعلا حلاصم عونتو ةايحلا روطتو ،ناكملاو نامزلا ريغت ةهجاومل
وأ كلذ يف وهف ،هقفلانمل ابلج وأ ةدسفمل اءرد ةعامجلا ةحلصم هيضتقت ام هجاويل رملأا ىلول ىلوأو بج اءرد وأ ةعف
اعم نيرملأل ابلجو.” 
104 The decree of law no. 48 for 1979 replaced the Supreme Court law issued by 
1970, transferring all the claims of constitutionality to the new supreme 
constitutional court. Revise the introductory clause of law no. 48 for 1979. 
105 Article 25 of Law no. 48 for 1979.  
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constitutional article as an invitation for the legislative authority to choose among 
any of the different Islamic schools, as all Islamic schools are equal to each 
other. There was no obligation to follow a certain opinion or school. The Supreme 
Court considered Article 280 of the Sharia’a courts law, which stated that judges 
are obliged to follow the opinions of the Hanafite School only, as limiting the 
scope of ijtihad and Islamic sharia’a and contradicting with Article 2. 106 
Accordingly, it was understood that the Supreme Court rejected Article 280 which 
limited the authority of judges to do takhayur, considering it against Article 2 and 
legislative purposes. 
b. Second Interpretation To Article 2 After The 
Amendment Of 1980 And Before 1985 
 
The Supreme Constitutional Court, which was established in 1979, was obliged 
to confront Article 2 after its amendment in the 1980s referendum. The new 
article emphasized the application of Islamic sharia’a by finding it as “the 
principal source of legislation.” It was controversial in that it changed the 
understanding of the Supreme Constitutional Court from its predecessor court. 
This policy of supporting takhayur which was directed at sharia’a courts and 
family disputes, coincided with the legislative philosophy of Sanhuri and the new 
modern legal system as represented by the verdict of the Supreme Court in 
1976. The new Supreme Constitutional Court, however, tried from the beginning 
to evade direct interpretation of the new article.  
In 1985, the Supreme Constitutional Court issued verdicts regarding two cases, 
deciding on claims of unconstitutionality against doctrines, based on the new 
version of Article 2. The first case involved a challenge to a civil law that allowed 
creditors to charge interest on overdue accounts. The second case concerned a 
                                                          
106See Appeal no. 10 for the Juridical year 5, The Supreme Court, 3rd of July 
1976, available at http://hccourt.gov.eg/ , “ ت ةيعدملا نأ ثيح نم ةفلاخم ًلاوأ ةداملا هذه ىلع ىعن
لإا ةعيرشلا ئدابمو ةلودلا نيد ملاسلإا" نأ ىلع صنت ىتلا ةيناثلا ةداملا صن امهلوأ روتسدلا نم نيصن ةيملاس
سلأا " نأ ىلع صنت ىتلا هنم ةعساتلا ةداملا نم ىلولأا ةرقفلا صن ىناثلاو "عيرشتلل ىسيئر ردصم ساسأ ةر
لأاو نيدلا اهماوق عمتجملا:ةيتلآا هجولأل كلذو "ةينطولاو قلاخ- إ روتسدلا نم ةيناثلا ةداملا نأ :لولأا هجولا تصن ذ
رشلا ماكحأ ىلإ عرشملا هيجوت ىنعت اهنإف ،عيرشتلل ىسيئر ردصم ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ئدابم نأ ىلع ةيملاسلإا ةعي
عم بهذمب ديقتلا نود ،ءاوسلا ىلع ةيهقفلا بهاذملا ةفاك مظتني ىلك ردصمكجرأب وأ بهاذملا كلت نم ني لاوقلأا ح
( ةداملا تناك ذإو ،اهيف280ا حجرأب ديقتلا ءاضقلا مازلإ ىلع تصن دق ةيعرشلا مكاحملا بيترت ةحئلا نم ) لاوقلأ
ناثلا ةداملا تفلاخ دق نوكت اهنإف رملأا ىلو هكلمي لا امم دييقتلا اذه ناكو ،هاوس نود ةفينح ىبأ بهذم نم نم ةي
لا .روتسدلاب قلاغإ هنأش نم ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا بهاذم نم نيعم بهذمب ديقتلا ءاضقلا مازلإ نأ :ىناثلا هجو با
نامز لك لهأ ىلع بجاو داهتجلاا نأ عم ،ءاحمسلا ةعيرشلا ديمجتو داهتجلاا.” 
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challenge to a 1979 family law article that increased women’s rights in divorce 
proceedings.  
In these two decisions, the Court’s interpretation of Article 2 was illogical. The 
Supreme Constitutional Court declared that both cases were non-justiciable. It 
stated that as the challenged articles were issued prior to the new amendment of 
the constitution, and that according to the merits of the committee issuing the 
amendment, Article 2 should be applied to subsequent laws. The challenge 
against those articles were out of the court’s jurisdiction. However, the minutes of 
the constitutional committee referred to the amendment within a time frame for 
the legislative organ to revise the legislation. The Supreme Constitutional Court 
decided to refute its own powers of challenging the law with these two verdicts 
and five years after the amendment’s adoption.107 
In both case no. 20 of Judicial Year 1, May 4, 1985, and case no. 28 of Judicial 
Year 2, May 4, 1985, the Supreme Constitutional Court strictly rejected 
challenges of constitutionality. But the Supreme Constitutional Court in case no. 
20 of Judicial year 1 criticized the family law, which was popularly known as 
Jihan’s law, because it was issued through the exceptional authorities of the 
presidency under emergency law. The court considered such an amendment of 
family law as non-urgent and to be declared by the single authority of the 
president. It also referred to the new amendment as contradicting general Islamic 
principles. Due to its issuance prior to the amendment of Article 2, the challenge 
was declared not-justiciable.  
In case No.28 of Judicial year 2, the Court followed the same rule of forfeiting the 
challenge as the challenged text was older than the amendment. The court 
stated that the 1980 amendment obliged the legislator to only depend on Islamic 
sharia’a sources and to choose among the different opinions of its schools –
takhayur- with no right to depend on other sources; and in the event of the 
absence of equivalent jurisdiction in Islamic sharia’a, Ijtihad was allowed through 
the legal thinking of Islamic schools. The court emphasized the necessity of 
giving the legislative authority time to revise legislation and issue new Islamic 
laws, and at the same time it affirmed the absence of the court’s authority to 
                                                          
107 Supra note 91. 
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 :ta elbaliava ,5891 yaM
وحيث إن المدعى “ ,1_txet_elur#xpsa.hcraeS_seluR/seluR/segaP/ge.vog.truocch//:ptth
) من القانون المدنى أنها إذ تقضى باستحقاق فوائد محددة القدر عن مجرد 622بصفته ينعى على نص المادة (
حت طبقاً للمادة مخالفة لمبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية التى أصب التأخر فى الوفاء بالإلتزام النقدى تكون قد انطوت على
ابل، فهى وذلك بإعتبار أن تلك الفوائد تمثل زيادة فى الدين بغير مق الثانية من الدستور "المصدر الرئيسى للتشريع".
طوع بها ثبوتاً عية المقالربا المتفق على تحريمه أخذًا بقوله تعالى "وأحل الله البيع وحرم الربا" وهو من الأحكام الشر
ن شأنها نسخ ودلالة والتى أصبحت بموجب المادة الثانية من الدستور فى مصاف القواعد القانونية الوضعية التى م
ة الأعمال ما كان سابقاً عليها متعارضاً معها من نصوص التشريعات الوضعية نسخاً ضمنيا،ً إذ صارت بذاتها واجب
يوليو  61فى  8491لسنة  131نها. وحيث إن القانون المدنى الصادر بالقانون رقم دون حاجة إلى صدور تشريع يقن
على أنه "إذا  -محل الطعن -) منه622ينص فى المادة ( 9491أكتوبر سنة  51والمعمول به إبتداء من  8491سنة 
ا ًبأن يدفع فاء به، كان ملزمكان محل الإلتزام مبلغا ًمن النقود، وكان معلوم المقدار وقت الطلب وتأخر المدين فى الو
المائة فى  للدائن على سبيل التعويض عن التأخر فوائد قدرها أربعة فى المائة فى المسائل المدنية و خمسة فى
التجارى  المسائل التجارية . وتسرى هذه الفوائد من تاريخ المطالبة القضائية بها، ان لم يحدد الاتفاق أو العرف
تم بتاريخ  وهذا كله ما لم ينص القانون على غيره". وحيث إنه يبين من تعديل الدستور الذىتاريخاً آخر لسريانها، 
مية، أن المادة الثانية أصبحت تنص على أن "الإسلام دين الدولة، واللغة العربية لغتها الرس 0891مايو سنة  22
سبتمبر سنة  11 صدور الدستور فى ومبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية المصدر الرئيسى للتشريع". بعد أن كانت تنص عند
سى على أن "الإسلام دين الدولة، واللغة العربية لغتها الرسمية، ومبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية مصدر رئي 1791
تداءًا من دستور للتشريع" والعبارة الأخيرة من هذا النص لم يكن لها سابقة فى أى من الدساتير المصرية المتعاقبة إب
لزام هذه ... إن المشرع الدستورى أتى بقيد على السلطة المختصة بالتشريع قوامه إ4691نة وحتى دستور س 3291
، وهو ما بالإلتجاء إلى مبادئ الشريعة لاستمداد الأحكام المنظمة للمجتمع -وهى بصدد وضع التشريعات -السلطة
 91بجلسة  عب والذى أقره المجلسأشارت إليه اللجنة الخاصة بالإعداد لتعديل الدستور فى تقريرها إلى مجلس الش
 03ة وأكدته اللجنة التى أعدت مشروع التعديل وقدمته إلى المجلس فناقشه ووافق عليه بجلس 9791يولية سنة 
ة بانها "تلزم إذ جاء فى تقريرها عن مقاصد تعديل الدستور بالنسبة للعبارة الأخيرة من المادة الثاني 0891إبريل سنة 
رها، فإذا لم لى أحكام الشريعة الإسلامية للبحث عن بغيته فيها مع إلزامه بعدم الالتجاء إلى غيالمشرع بالالتجاء إ
يعة يجد فى الشريعة الإسلامية حكماً صريحا،ً فإن وسائل استنباط الأحكام من المصادر الاجتهادية فى الشر
عة". ولما لأصول والمبادئ العامة للشريالإسلامية تمكن المشرع من التوصل إلى الأحكام اللازمة والتى لا تخالف ا
من الدستور فى  كان مفاد ما تقدم، أن سلطة التشريع إعتبارًا من تاريخ العمل بتعديل العبارة الأخيرة من المادة الثانية
ذا التاريخ، أصبحت مقيدة فيما تسنه من تشريعات مستحدثه أو معدله لتشريعات سابقة على ه -0891مايو سنة  22
لدستور ة أن تكون هذه التشريعات متفقة مع مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية ... وحيث إن إعمال المادة الثانية من ابمراعا
لرئيسى لما على ما تقدم بيانه، وإن كان مؤداه: إلزام المشرع بأتخاذ مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية المصدر ا -بعد تعديلها
إذا لم يلتزم  زام بما يترتب عليه من إعتباره مخالفاً للدستوريضعه من تشريعات بعد التاريخ الذى فرض هذا الإل
التشريعات  بذلك القيد، إلا أن قصر هذا الإلزام على تلك التشريعات لا يعنى اعفاء المشرع من تبعة الابقاء على
ة لسياسية ارغم ما قد يشوبها من تعارض مع مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية، وإنما يلقى على عاتقه من الناحي -السابقة
تساق بينها وبين مسئولية المبادره إلى تنقيه نصوص هذة التشريعات من أية مخالفة للمبادئ سالفة الذكر، تحقيقاً للإ
ما تقدم،  التشريعات اللا حقة فى وجوب اتفاقها جميعاً مع هذه المبادئ وعدم الخروج عليها. وحيث إنه ترتيباً على
 من القانون المدنى للمادة الثانية من الدستور تأسيساً على أن فوائد) 622ولما كان مبنى الطعن مخالفة المادة (
لمادة الثانية من التأخير المستحقة بموجبها تعد من الربا المحرم شرعاً طبقاً لمبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية التى جعلتها ا
مايو سنة  22خ ديلها بتاريبعد تع -الدستور المصدر الرئيسى للتشريع، وإذ كان القيد المقرر بمقتضى هذه المادة 
السابقة عليه  لا يتأتى أعما له بالنسبة للتشريعات -والمتضمن إلزام المشرع بعدم مخالفة الشريعة الإسلامية 0891
لم يلحقها أى تعديل بعد التاريخ  8491) من القانون المدنى الصادر سنة 622حسبما سلف بيانه، وكانت المادة (
ه الرأى فى بمخالفة حكم المادة الثانية من الدستور وأيا ًكان وج -النعى عليها، وحالتها هذه  المشار إليه، ومن ثم، فإن
 .” ىيكون فى غير محله. الأمر الذى يتعين معه الحكم برفض الدعو -تعارضها مع مبادئ الشريعة الإسلامية 
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Islamic sharia’a rules into two types of sharia’a: certain and uncertain. The Court 
defined the certain rules of sharia’a as being the binding rules for all Muslims, 
and the uncertain rules derived through ijtihad as not binding. The court 
mentioned the necessity of identifying those certain rules of sharia’a, so 
legislative work could be practiced without contradicting them. If there were no 
certain rules of sharia’a, legislators must then perform ijtihad and devise laws. 
The Court referred to the state as the wali al-amr or the governor, which is a form 
of al-syasa al-shara’ya theory from traditional Islamic fiqh, especially from Ibn 
Taimia’s ideas, to allow state wider authority in legislating.109 According to the 
courts verdict, the state is entitled, as wali al-amr, to choose the appropriate rule 
to be applied either through certain rules of sharia’a or through implementing 
Ijtihad to formulate rules in the uncertain area. The only barrier before the state is 
its obligation not to contradict the certain rules of sharia’a. So according to Article 
2, the principles of Islamic sharia’a that the state is required to apply is through 
Ijtihad. The state is entitled to do takhayur from Islamic schools’ opinions to be 
stated within its laws. There is no problem to do talfiq as long as each part of the 
law had its origins in Islamic heritage and the outcome does not contradict 
certain areas of sharia’a. The Court also identified its role then as a reviser and 
ensurer of laws to ensure that certain areas of sharia’a did not contradict; it had 
no authority over legislation regarding the issuing of laws through Ijtihad in other 
uncertain areas. 
According to the Supreme Constitutional Court verdict in case No.7, the certain 
sharia’a area is characterized by absolute clarity in authenticity and meaning. To 
be clearly authentic, there should be no doubt about the religious text 
authenticity. The required certainty of meaning requires the agreement of all 
Islamic jurists on the meaning of the text, which is almost impossible. Indirectly, 
the court is stating both conditions together to evade the Qur’anic texts, which 
are declared by the court as being authentic in wording but with meaning varying 
among Islamic schools. The Prophet’s sayings or hadiths are not on the same 
level of obligation as the Qur’anic text which open the jtihad’s. Accordingly, the 
only way to evade the clear application of Qur’anic text is requiring the certainty 
of its meaning. The Supreme Constitutional Court required proof of such certainty 
of meaning with the agreement of all Islamic jurists on the same meaning. This is 
almost impossible to achieve and narrows the applicable sharia’a to a few cases.  
                                                          
109 Supra note 91, at 213- 227. 
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Case no. 7 concerns the claim of unconstitutionality regarding the right of 
mothers to child custody till the age of ten for boys and the age of twelve for girls, 
as stated in law no 25 of 1929 as amended by law no. 100 of 1985.110 While the 
mother’s party claimed its right to custody till the maximum limit as stated by law, 
the husband’s party claimed that this age limit contradicted the Hanafite School 
which is the dominant school of personal status law in Egypt, 111 and contradicts 
Article 2. The court sent the question of its constitutionality to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court. 
According to the new perception of sharia’a by the Supreme Constitutional Court 
and the meaning of Article 2 of the constitution as being an application of certain 
rules of Islamic sharia’a, the Court decided that there was no Qur’anic or other 
text that is certain in its meaning and authenticity to determine the age for 
hadana or child custody as the age of the hadana or custodian is determined 
through the Ijtihad of different schools. The State is not obliged to determine a 
certain range of age using any of these schools, but contrarily the state has the 
duty to conduct Ijtihad to determine that the age is in accordance with societal 
and children’s interests. 112 The Court also hinted at the legal custodian age as 
being in conformity with one of the Maliki school’s opinions. In its decision, the 
Court considered the challenge of unconstitutionality as invalid and rejected that 
claim.   
C. Sharia’a Application has Lead To Uncertainty Of Legal Practice:  
Article 2 has troubled the Egyptian legal system, as it complicates the legal 
hybridity differentiating it from Sanhuri’s, Abdou’s and others’ ideas. It obliges 
that all legislation follow the main principles of Islamic sharia’a, with no clear 
definition of what the Islamic sharia’a principles actually are, and with no 
consideration of those laws inspired by Western legislation. Egyptian high courts, 
especially the Court of Cassation and the Supreme Constitutional Court hold the 
responsibility for defining the article. The Supreme Administrative Court has also 
had a role in interpreting the second article similarly to both the Constitutional 
and Cassation Courts.113  
                                                          
110 Supra note 91, at 191, (This amendment was issued in law no. 44 of 1979, 
which was named publicly as Jihan’s law, the law was reissued in a new format 
of law no. 100 of 1985). 
111 Supra notes 4 and 91. 
112 Supra notes 4 and 91. 
113 Supra note 91. 
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The main actions of the courts reflect ignorance of the constitutional amendment 
of 1980. Some authors saw it as being politically motivated, but further analysis 
of the judicial decisions reflect judicial confusion. The judicial authority in general 
and the legal community in particular did not fully understand how the legal 
system could work after the amendments. It was understood that laws, as parts 
of a modern legal system, created a lot of duties and rights in accordance with 
these texts. Thus, any change to one of the Islamic sharia’a rules would change 
the paradigm and require clarification of the new legal rule, its source and 
formation. The second point of confusion was the mechanism for choosing 
sharia’a schools, whether through choosing a particular school or the common 
takhayur and talfiq of the modernist idea. 114 
The Supreme Constitutional Court in its verdict of case No. 7 in 1993 worked on 
solving that problem by finding a new analysis of the text. The simplicity of that 
verdict in defining Islamic sharia’a principles was based on the classification of 
certain sharia’a principles versus uncertain sharia’a principles. This classification 
by the Court was based on the Islamic theory of al-syasa al-shara’ya in 
accordance with Ibn Taimia’s ideas about the authority of the wali al-amr, or the 
state, in issuing legislation. 115 
Ibn Taimia’s ideas are based on the authority of the wali al-amr or the governor 
to conclude legal rules over the Muslim community in order to achieve the 
purposes of sharia’a, with no obligation to follow the merits or rules of any of the 
Islamic schools. The only obligation of the wali al-amr was to not contradict the 
recognized aspects of sharia’a by all schools. 116 
The Constitutional Court decided that the state had its own authority to choose 
among the Islamic schools as wali al-amr, and accordingly it allowed for the state 
to conclude its own decisions as long as it was far from the certain areas in 
Islamic sharia’a. The Supreme Constitutional Court’s position looks similar to that 
of Sanhuri’s, but it denied as well, the state’s right to include laws from sources 
other than sharia’a as long as there was no clear root in sharia’a. In such a case, 
the state was obliged to do Ijtihad to reach a new rule consistent with sharia’a 
opinions and purposes.117 
                                                          
114 Supra notes 3 and 91. 
115 Supra note 3. 
116 Supra notes 3 and 6. 
117 Supra notes 3 and 6. 
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It is clear that the new understanding of Islamic sharia’a is not popular among 
legal professionals and politicians. Until today, there is a debate about the 
effectiveness of Article 2 in applying Islamic sharia’a. That is why Islamic parties 
after the 25th of January Uprising have tried to promote the application of Islamic 
sharia’a in a more conservative manner. 
In the 2012 Constitution, a new article was adopted, number 219, which stated 
that “The principles of Islamic sharia’a include general evidence, foundational 
rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines 
and by the larger community.” The new article was an attempt to widen the scope 
of application of Islamic sharia’a by stating the general evidence, foundational 
rules and rules of jurisprudence. But at the same time, there is a restriction to 
only Sunni schools in Islamic sharia’a. This article was omitted after the broad 
amendments to the 2012 constitution after the ouster of the Islamic party in 
2014.118  
D. Conclusion: 
The uncertainty of the Egyptian legal system due to its hybrid nature - between 
modernity and Islamic sharia’a - is clearly seen through the application of 
Constitutional Article 2. This controversial article that was first introduced in the 
legal system in the 1971 Constitution has continued up to the new Constitution 
and its amendment in 2014.  
The Court of Cassation has passed through several stages in dealing with this 
article including ignoring it or by shifting its duty to the legislative authority. But 
some verdicts of the Court of Cassation have tried to identify what is Islamic and 
what is non- Islamic either as a criticism of the legal text or as an interpretation of 
it. In the end, the Court of Cassation followed the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court in classifying the Islamic sharia’a into certain and uncertain 
areas to identify the applicable rules.  
The Supreme Constitutional Court which tried to ignore the new amendment in 
the beginning, lived up to its role in the historic decision of case no.7 in the 
judicial year 8. In this verdict the Supreme Constitutional Court defined Islamic 
sharia’a and its role in identifying the Islamic principles that should be followed by 
the legislative authority. It established a new theory of Islamic law under the 
                                                          
118 See supra note 88, it may be considered that the amendment of 2014 is an 
establishment of a new constitution, that the amendment was very wide to 
include nearly the whole constitutional order of 2012.  
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takhayur and talfiq principles as proposed by Sanhuri and Abdou. It widened the 
scope of legislative authority to do Ijtihad as long as there is no certain text to 
follow, and limited the sphere of certain texts by ensuring the certainty on both 
authenticity and meaning through all jurists’ consensus and Islamic schools.  
The new application of Article 2 in the Egyptian legal system created a lot of 
uncertainty and ambiguity that have worked as a trap for Egyptian courts. Even 
after the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court in defining the meaning of 
Article 2, some legal and political parties saw the Supreme Constitutional Court 
as escaping from its duty to apply the essence of Article 2. There has been an 
attempt to force the state to follow more the traditional opinions by adding a new 
article to the Constitution. All of these attempts lack real vision in interpreting the 
legal rule practice through Islamic sharia’a which has been uncertain since its 
original application. None of the new visions solve the problem of the multi-
jurisdiction nature of Islamic schools except through reference to Sanhuri’s ideas, 
or to Ibn Taimia’s theory of al-syasa al-shara’ya. 
V. Criminal Application Of Islamic Sharia’a Under Article 60 Of The 
Egyptian Penal Code 
The Egyptian penal code was adopted in 1937 as a product of the modernization 
movement at the beginning of the twentieth century. The most notable thing 
about the penal code is that it has maintained its hybrid nature combining 
modernity and traditionalism. While modern legal systems are positive in their 
core beliefs that punishment is not the sole purpose, in and of itself, but is rather 
a tool for rehabilitation of the criminal,119 the Egyptian legal system combined 
deterrence and rehabilitation as goals of punishment. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court stated clearly in its verdicts that the main goal of the 
punishment is the personal deterrence of the criminal.120 Accordingly, the jails 
and prisons were identified as rehabilitation centers in the constitutional article 
no. 56,121 but the work of the penal and criminal codes still focus on deterrence 
and revenge. 
An understanding of this penal system is important through exploring the Islamic 
criminal system which has affected the formulation of the current criminal system. 
Through tracking Article 60 of the Penal Code and how it has been interpreted by 
courts, an understanding of the problem of the uncertainty of Islamic sharia’a 
application in a hybrid system is revealed.  
A. The Nature Of Punishment In The Islamic Legal System 
The Islamic legal system is based on the divine nature of its ruling. Punishment is 
either a divine order dictated by sharia’a or based on people’s interests. 
                                                          
119 See, Ogechi E. Anyanwu, Crime And Justice In Postcolonial Nigeria:  The 
Justifications And Challenges Of Islamic Law Of Shari’ah, Vol. 21, No. 2, Journal 
of Law and Religion, pp. 315-347, 326-328, (Cambridge University Press, 
(2005/2006), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/30040588. 
120 See Appeal no. 114. For the Juridical year 21, Supreme Constitutional Court, 
2nd of May 2001, vol.9, page 986: 
 م لمحيل ريغلل ماعلا عدرلاو فرتقا امل ءازج مرجملل صاخلا رجزلا وه ةيئانجلا ةبوقعلا نم فدهلا ناك امل ن
يلع ةميرجلا مهباكتررا لمتحي  ةداملا نم ةعبارلا ةرقفلا تناكو اهنايتإ نع ضارعلإا48  ةبوقعلا عيقوت ررقت
كترا متي مل ولو يتح اهفارتقا يلع قافتلاا درجم يلع قافتلاا لحم ةحنجلا وأ ةيانجلا باكترلا ةررقملا اهنإف لاعف اهبا
ةميرجلا باكترا يلع نيقفتملا عجشي دق كلذ نإ لب اصاخ لاو اعدر ققحت لا كلذب نأ املاط قافتلاا لحم  درجم
اهباكترا ةبوقع تاذب مهتبقاعم يلإ يدؤيس اهفارتقا يلع قافتلاا . 
121 Egyptian Constitution 2014, Article 56, stating that “A prison is a place of 
correction and rehabilitation. Prisons and places of detention shall be subject to 
judiciary supervision, where actions inconsistent with human dignity or which 
endanger human health shall be prohibited. The Law shall regulate the 
provisions of reform and rehabilitation of convicted persons and facilitating 
decent lives after their release”. ةدام (56)   نكامأو نوجسلا عضخت .ليهأتو حلاصإ راد نجسلا
هتحص ضرعي وأ ،ناسنلإا ةمارك ىفاني ام لك اهيف رظحيو ،ىئاضقلا فارشلإل زاجتحلاا  رطخلل. نوناقلا مظنيو
مهنع جارفلإا دعب مهل ةميركلا ةايحلا لبس ريسيتو ،مهيلع موكحملا ليهأت و حلاصإ ماكحأ 
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According to Islamic sharia’a, punishment is either hudu’d or ta’zir. The hudu’d 
are punishments stated by God and as understood from the Quran. Most Islamic 
schools accept that there are five hudu’d: murder, theft, fornication, specific 
defamation, and ridda or apostasy.122 Islamic schools have their own opinions 
and rules about the specific definition of each crime under Hudu’d and their 
application, especially because hudu’d involves severe physical punishment 
including the death penalty. Among the schools, there is general agreement that 
hudu’d forms the core of the Islamic penal system. 
Ta’zir, on the other hand, is the substitute punishment that is decided by the wali 
al-amr or the governor, or al- qadi, the judge. This punishment can be for a crime 
which is not covered by the Quran in hudu’d, or as a substitute for hudu’d. For 
example, the Shafiite School accepts punishing thieves through ta’zir instead of 
applying hadd, which is a cutting off of the hands.123 Ta’zir can be through 
physical or monetary forms of punishment.  124  
The punishment system in Islamic sharia’a is not different from its medieval 
forms of punishment, justification, and morality. Deterrence and revenge are the 
main purposes of punishment within the penal system. It is based on the Qur’anic 
verse which states that "We ordained therein for them: Life for a life, eye for an 
eye, nose for a nose, ear for an ear, tooth for a tooth, and one wound equal to 
another."125 The traditional Islamic legal system does not distinguish between 
torts and crimes in the same way that the Western legal systems do. Punishment 
is concentrated on revenge and deterrence, whereby tort was developed later as 
a civil law issue. 126 
Generally it is possible to classify other punishments in Islam such as fiscal 
punishment, through paying money either for al-dya or a victim’s compensation. 
Fiscal punishment can be implied for not executing decisions of the qadi, 
governor or other state councils.127 
                                                          
122 See supra note 4, at 311, 312. 
123 Id. 
124 Supra note 4, at 322, 323. 
125 Quranic Verse no. 45 of Surrat Alma’eda, available at 
http://www.oneummah.net/quran/book/5.html 
126 See, Majid Khadduri & Herbert J. Liebesny, Law in the Middle East, with a 
foreword by Justice Robert h. Jackson, vol.1, (Origins and Development of 
Islamic Law, the Middle East institute, Washington DC 1955). 
127 Supra note 80. 
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Some crimes in Islamic sharia’a are accompanied by a waiver of rights. And 
there are some complementary punishments such as for those accused of 
fornication not seen in other cases. 128 
Also, the discretionary power of al-qadi can replace all of the previous 
punishments with an admonition by the qadi. In this case, the accused receive 
just verbal admonition and advice.129 
There is also a spiritual purpose behind punishment in the Islamic system, which 
is avoidance of divine punishment in the afterlife. Judgement day, as a part of 
Islamic belief, requires a person to behave in a correct way and that includes 
accepting and imposing punishments on criminals.130 Accordingly, justification of 
the penal system is based on religious grounds besides revenge and deterrence.  
B. The Nature Of Punishment In The Modern Legal System 
Although the modern Egyptian legal system is inspired by the Western legal 
system, it does not fulfill its vision about the purpose of punishment. It mixes the 
application of modern Western systems with an Islamic understanding of 
punishment. This is seen in the wording of the penal and criminal codes in Egypt, 
such as using hatk al-a’erd which describes the sexual crimes against women to 
be for any sexual assault against both genders.131 The term hatk al-a’erd 
represents an Islamic understanding that committing such actions against 
women is against the men protecting them, whether husbands, fathers or other 
relatives. It is thus possible to understand why rape as a crime in the Egyptian 
legal system is only applied to female victims, with specification that the criminal 
action is to be in a singular form of the penetration of the female organ by the 
male organ using force. Such a limitation of rape to female victims is based on 
other traditional understandings of rape where part of the justification for 
penalization is risk of pregnancy, rather than harm to the victim.132  
Although the penal code adopted in 1937, like the modern European codes, did 
not include physical punishment, it kept the death penalty for several crimes 
including murder and treason. The classification of crimes is much closer to the 
modern legal system than the traditional one, where crimes are classified into 
                                                          
128 Supra note 4 
129 Supra note 3 and 4 
130 Supra note 3 
131 Egyptian Penal Code article 268, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf  
132 Supra note 3, and id, Article 268 in Egyptian penal law stated that “Whoever 
indecently assaults a person by force or threat, or attempts such assault shall be 
punished with hard labor for three to seven years”. 
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felonies, misdemeanors and violations. Accordingly, the severity of the crime 
defines the punishment. Felonies are generally punished by jailing, and 
sometimes by the death penalty, and misdemeanors are punished through 
simple imprisonment and/or fines, and violations by fines below 100 Egyptian 
pounds.133 
The purpose of the new penal code was shared amongst revenge, deterrence 
and rehabilitation, but there is no clear emphasis on rehabilitation, unlike 
deterrence which is mentioned in court rulings explicitly. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruling in case no.114, for the 21st judicial year, emphasized 
deterrence as the main purpose of the punishment in the legal system: 
As the purpose of penal punishment is the deterrence for the criminal 
himself, for what he committed, and the public deterrence for others, to 
push the ones who intended to commit similar crime to desist from 
committing it.134 
It can be understood from this ruling how the value of deterrence is prized in the 
Egyptian legal system, whereby even the Supreme Constitutional Court justifies 
the penal rule based on how effective a deterrent it is.  
C. Court Of Cassation Interpretation Of Article 60 In The Egyptian 
Penal Code 
There are several controversial articles in the penal code concerning the 
utilization of Islamic sharia’a. Article 60 is a well-known article that refers to an 
allowance to avoid penal provisions under sharia’a. The provisions of the penal 
                                                          
133Egyptian penal code Article 9 stated that ”Crimes are of three kinds: First: 
Felonies, Second: Misdemeanors, Third: Violations “,Article 10 stated that “ 
Felonies are crimes liable to the following penalties: Capital punishment, 
Permanent hard labor Punishment, Temporary hard labor Punishment 
Imprisonment”, Article 11 stated that “Misdemeanors are crimes liable to the 
following penalties: Detention, Fine the ceiling of which exceeding one hundred 
Egyptian pounds”, Article 12 stated that ”Violations are crimes penalized with a 
fine the ceiling of which does not exceeding one hundred Egyptian pounds.”, 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf 
134 See Appeal No. 114, for The juridical year 21, Supreme Constitutional Court , 
2nd of June 2001, vol.9, at 986: “ ءازج مرجملل صاخلا رجزلا وه ةيئانجلا ةبوقعلا نم فدهلا ناك امل
قفلا تناكو اهنايتإ نع ضارعلإا يلع ةميرجلا مهباكترا لمتحي نم لمحيل ريغلل ماعلا عدرلاو فرتقا امل ةعبارلا ةر
 ةداملا نم48 يلع قافتلاا لحم ةحنجلا وأ ةيانجلا باكترلا ةررقملا ةبوقعلا عيقوت ررقت ع قافتلاا درجم اهفارتقا يل
لع نيقفتملا عجشي دق كلذ نإ لب اصاخ لاو اعدر ققحت لا كلذب اهنإف لاعف اهباكترا متي مل ولو يتح باكترا ي
اهباكترا ةبوقع تاذب مهتبقاعم يلإ يدؤيس اهفارتقا يلع قافتلاا درجم نأ املاط قافتلاا لحم ةميرجلا. 
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code may not apply to any deed committed in good faith, pursuant to a right 
determined by virtue of the sharia’a.135 
Despite the simple wording of Article 60, there are ambiguities about the 
meaning of the word sharia’a and how it can be interpreted. It is the same 
problem as the multi-jurisdiction of Islamic schools seen in courts dealing with 
Article 60. Generally, courts favor takhayur amongst Islamic schools and some 
rulings favor an understanding of Islamic sharia’a similar to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court’s understanding about certain and uncertain sharia’a. 
1. Sharia’a Is Superior To Legal Text 
Court of Cassation verdicts have faced appeals based on the righteous action of 
the appellant. One of the well-known claims concerns the right of the husband 
under Islamic sharia’a to discipline his wife using physical punishment. 
In Court of Cassation case No. 6648 for the judicial year 63, an appeal was made 
claiming that the appellant’s actions against his wife were not intended except as 
an exercise of his right to discipline his wife. The actions of the husband lead to 
the death of the wife as confirmed by autopsy reports of forensic experts. The 
Court of Cassation refuted the claim: 
It is affirmed that husband has a right to discipline his wife, but this right 
is limited to slight harming, but exceeding such slight harm shall be 
penalized even if it is only simple abrasions on the wife’s body… As it is 
proved that the appellant did beat his wife causing her the described 
injuries in the anatomy report… which cause after that her death, it is 
sufficient to consider his action as out of the husband’s rights in 
accordance to sharia’a and he shall be punished according to article 
236136 of penal code137 
                                                          
135 Egyptian Penal code Article 60, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf 
136 Egyptian Penal Code, Article 236 states that “Whoever wounds or beats 
someone on purpose or gives him harmful material without meaning thereby to 
kill, but doing that had led to death, shall be punished with hard labor or 
imprisonment, for a period of three to seven years…”, available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/criminal-code.pdf 
137See Appeal no.6848, for the Juridical year no.63, Court of Cassation, 22nd of 
December 1994, vol.45, at 1230: ءاذيلأا ىدعتي نأ زوجي لا نكلو جوزلل قح بيدأتلا نأ ررقملا نم 
لأا ناك ولو ىتح ،انوناق هيلع ابقاعم ناكو ،هتجوز مسجب ىذأ ثدحإف ،دحلا اذه جوزلا زواجت اذإف فيفخلا مسجب رث
م تباثلا ناكو ،كلذ ناكو ،كلذ ناك امل ةطيسب تاحجس نع دزي مل ةجوزلا نأ هيف نوعطملا مكحلا تانودم ن
كو ،ةيحيرشتلا ةفصلا ريرقتب ةفوصوملا ةباصلإا اهب ثدحأو هتجوز ىلع برضلاب ىدتعا دق نعاطلا نم نيبلا نا
نطبلا راسي مدقم ىلعأو ردصلا راسيل لفسلأا ءزجلا ىصقأب هيضر ةمدك اهيلع ىنجملا نأ ريرقتلا اذه  نم ثدحت
ون ليقث ضار بلص مسجب ةمداصملان لاحطلا جيسنو رهوجب ايباصا اكتهت تثدحا بوط بلاق لثم نم اع هنع مج
ع اجراخ هنم عقو ام رابتعلا فاك اذه نإف ،ةافولا ىلإ ىدأ ىنطبلا فيوجتلا لخادب ريزغ ىلخاد ىومد فيزن ن
 ةداملا نم ىلولا ةرقفلاب لامع باقعلل ابجوتسمو ةعيرشلا ىضتقمب ررقملا هقح دودح236 قعلا نوناق نم لاو ،تابو
نلاطبلا رهاظلا ىنوناقلا عافدلا اذه نع تتفتلا ىه نإ ةمكحملا ىلع حانج . 
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So it is understood from the previous ruling that the Court of Cassation does not 
deny the right of the husband to beat his wife as long as it does not leave traces 
on her body such as abrasions. Accordingly, the severity of the beating is the 
reason for the punishment not the action itself. This contradicts with what is 
stated in Article 377 whereby “a penalty of fine not exceeding hundred Egyptian 
pounds shall be inflicted on whoever commits any of the following deeds… (9) 
Whoever creates an altercation, aggression, or light mischief that does not result 
in beating or wounds.” 
This is a very good example of a court ruling that interprets sharia’a in a broad 
way allowing actions justified in Islamic sharia’a even if contradicting the legal 
text of the penal law.  
The preceding example is not a singular case. There are other cases such as 
case No. 21092 of judicial year 63, whereby the appellant was accused of 
possessing a firearm without a license. It is a crime under law no 394 for the year 
1954; the law states that possessing or obtaining an arm with no license is a 
felony, regardless of its usage or intent behind its possession. In this case, the 
appellant used possession of the firearm as justification for having intention to 
submit it to the public authorities. 
The Court of Cassation accepted the appellant’s claim according to Article 60 
justification although it is penalized in a different code as follows: 
[A]s the article 25 of criminal procedural law allowed any person who is 
informed by crime occurrence to report it to the public prosecution, which 
could also proceed its authority with no necessity of request or 
complaint. However some sorts of reporting will require such person to 
keep the body of the crime (which is an arm in that case) to submit it to 
the public authority, and it is possible that the possession or attainting of 
such body is illegalized, but according to article no. 60 of penal code 
which stated that the provisions of penal code may not apply to any deed 
committed in good faith, pursuant to a right determined by virtue of the 
sharia’a, and as proved from the merits of the challenged court verdict 
that the appellant possession for the alleged arm was by intention to 
submit it to the police officer, and that he submitted it directly after the 
police arrival, which is a proof to negate the criminal intention on his 
side… Hereby and accordingly the court is to repeal the appealed verdict 
and restating and declaring the appellant as innocent 138 
                                                          
138See Appeal no.21092, for the Juridical year 63, Court of Cassation , 27th of 
January 2003, vol. 54, page 220:  ةداملا نأ ررقملا نم ناك امل25  ةيئانجلا تاءارجلإا نوناق نم
 تحابأا غلبي نأ ،بلط وأ ىوكش ريغب اهنع ىوعدلا عفر ةماعلا ةباينلل زوجي ةميرج عوقوب ملع نم لكل ةماعلا ةباينل
تو ةميرجلا مسجب ظافتحلاا يضتقي هروص ضعب يف غيلبتلاو اهنع يئاضقلا طبضلا يرومأم دحأ وأ ةطلسلا ىلإ هميدق
 وأ هتزايح نوناقلا رظحي امم ةميرجلا مسج نوكي دقو ةماعلالاط امهم ةلاحلا هذه يف هب ظافتحلاا نأ لاإ هزارحإ 
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In this court decision it is not clear how Islamic sharia’a, in its essence, justifies 
the deed of the appellant. It can be understood in the texts of the law itself. Law 
No 394 for 1954 interprets arms possession as an intention to possess the arm 
accompanied by practice of such intention. There are other understandings but in 
this case the intention of possession did not exist which negates the legal text. 
The court ignored previous justifications and decided to interpret the text broadly 
using justifications from sharia’a. In both cases the court ruling favored Islamic 
sharia’a application over the written law articles.  
2. Justifying Modern Judicial Verdicts Based On 
Sharia’a Understanding 
In case no. 48168 for the judicial year no. 73, the Court of Cassation faced an 
appeal regarding a judicial verdict sentencing the appellant in a drug crime as 
being unconstitutional according to Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, and 
against the rights of the appellant in accordance with Article 60 to evade 
punishment as long his deed was justified under Islamic sharia’a. The Court 
responded to this claim by reclassifying the criminalized action in accordance 
with the Islamic classification. It considered the claim of the witness as wrongful 
as long as the crime was one of the ta’zir crimes and not hudu’d as follows:   
[T]he challenge of unconstitutionality of the court verdict as the 
accusation was built on singular witness of the police officer, on contrary 
of the limits of witnesses required by blessed sharia’a is invalid, that is 
because the witnesses number limit in Islamic sharia’a is for the 
witnessing in hudu’d and life crimes but the accusation of the trial is 
related to one of Ta’zir crime that is under judge’s discretion with no 
obligation of following certain tool of proofing.139 
Here the Court of Cassation surprisingly classified the crimes of the modern legal 
system into hudu’d and ta’zir similar to the traditional classification. The Court 
avoided the modern classification of crimes into felonies, misdemeanors and 
                                                                                                                                                
يرجلا عباطب مستي هرهاظ يف ناك نإو ريغتي مل غيلبتلا وهو هنم دصقلا مادام هتعيبط ريغتت لا هدمأ ًلامع كلذو ةم
 ةداملاب60 بكترا لعف لك ىلع تابوقعلا نوناق ماكحأ ىرست لا" هنأ ىلع صنت يتلا تابوقعلا نوناق نم ميلس ةينب ة
اطلا زارحإ نأ هيف نوعطملا مكحلا هدرس امم نيبلا ناكو ،كلذ ناك امل ."ةعيرشلا ىضتقمب ررقم قحب ًلامع نع
مب هب رداب ام وهو يئاضقلا طبضلا رومأمل هميلستل هب ظافتحلاا دصقب لاإ نكي مل طوبضملا حلاسلا ،هيلإ هلوصو درج
 ذإو ،ينوناقلا هانعمب زارحلإا دصق هعم يفتني ام وهوف ىرجو رظنلا اذه فلاخ دق هيف نوعطملا مكحلا ناك هئاضق ي
قلا قيبطت يف أطخأ دق نوكي هنإف ،طوبضملا حلاسلل نعاطلا زارحإ درجمل يئانجلا دصقلا رفاوت ىلع هليوأتو نونا
 ةداملا نم ىلولأا ةرقفلاب ًلامع نعاطلا ةءاربب مكحلاو هضقن بجوي امب39 أ نعطلا تاءارجإو تلااح نوناق نم مام
ضقنلا ةمكحم 
139 See Appeal no. 48186, for The Juridical year 73, Court of Cassation, 8th of 
February 2010, vol. 54, at 224 و طباضلا ةداهش ىلع ماهتلاا مايقل ةمكاحملا ةيروتسد مدعب لوقلا امأ هدح
لذ ،نلاطبلا رهاظ وهف ءارغلا ةعيرشلا هتبلطت يذلا باصنلا فلاخ ىلعاهشلا باصن لوح ةحاشملا نأب ك امنإ ةد
ضاقلا ديقتي لا ةيزيزعت ةميرجب قلعتت ةلثاملا ةمهتلا امنيب ءامدلاو دودحلا ىلع ةداهشلا لوح تزكرت ةادأب اهتابثإ يف ي
ةنيعم. 
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violations, by not justifying the burden of proof on the basis of criminal procedural 
law which allows the judge to state his decision as long as his belief in the 
evidence is sufficient to reach its verdict. The Court instead justified its decision 
on the grounds that ta’zir crimes do not require the same proof of authenticity as 
hudu’d. Classifying drug laws as being part of ta’zir crimes allows the judge to 
depend on the presence of one witness as enough proof.   
3. Sharia’a Is Inferior To Legal Text 
The Court of Cassation followed another set of verdicts consistent with modern 
law philosophy. It kept the legal text’s superiority over other sharia’a and fiqh 
texts. One of the examples is case no. 1193 for the judicial year 29. In this case, 
an appeal was raised before the Court of Cassation to challenge the criminal 
sentence imposed on the appellants for performing an abortion. The merits of the 
case are that two husbands agreed to the abortions and went to a well-known 
doctor to perform the medical procedure. Both the husbands and the doctor were 
condemned for committing the crime of abortion in accordance with the Egyptian 
penal code, which penalizes abortion even with the free will of the mother. The 
appellant challenged that court verdict on the basis of Islamic sharia’a which 
allows abortion till the fourth month of pregnancy, considering it as a rightful deed 
for husbands under sharia’a. The Court of Cassation refuted the claim of 
justification on the sharia’a basis on two grounds. The first one is that abortion is 
criminalized by direct legal text, and the second one is that abortion allowance is 
not part of the certain sharia’a under Article 60: 
[T]hat the appellant stated that Islamic sharia’a allowed abortion till four 
pregnancy months and the Article 60 of penal code allows what is 
allowed by sharia’a, this appeal is unacceptable as long as the law 
punish abortion action, illegalizing it; that Article 60 allows deeds that are 
committed pursuant to right stated by law in general, and the illegalizing 
of abortion by legislator prevent considering it as pursuant to a right but 
instead it is a crime that its committer deserve punish for it… In addition 
the court didn’t agree that abortion allowance in Islamic sharia’a is from 
the certain area in its authenticity but it’s a controversial output of Ijtihad 
of scholars.140  
                                                          
140See Appeal no. 1193, For the Juridical year 29, Court, Of Cassation, 23rd of 
November 1959, vol.10, at 952:  نأ نم عوضوملا ةمكحم مامأ هعافد يف نعاطلا هيلإ ضرع ام نإف
 ةداملا نأو رهشأ ةعبرأ هرمع زواجتي مل يذلا نينجلا ضاهجإ حيبت ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا60  حيبت تابوقعلا نوناق نم
 ةعيرشلا هحيبت ام- ا ىلع بقاعي نوناقلا ماد ام ًلاوبقم نوكي لا كلذ نم نعاطلا هيلإ ضرع امجيو طاقسلإ هنم لع
 ةداملا نلأو ،ًامرحم ًلاعف60 ا ميرحتو ،ةماع ةفصب نوناقلا هررق قحب ًلامع بكترت يتلا لاعفلأا حيبت امنإ عراشل
باقعلا اهيناج قحتسي ةميرج عقو اذإ هنم لعجي امنإو قحب ًاطبترم لعفلا اذه رابتعا نود لوحي طاقسلإل  هضرف يذلا
كحلا بيعي لاو ،هتلعفل عراشلانم دافتسم درلا اذه نلأ هيلع دريو عافدلا اذه هبابسأ يف لوانتي لا نأ م  مكحلا قايس
 داوملا اهيلع قبطنت مئارج اهنوك فصوب نيمهتملل تدنسأ يتلا عئاقولا نم هيف لثام وه امو260 و263 و236 
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In this court verdict, the Court presented the legal text as being of a higher level 
than the unwritten rules of sharia’a, applying the criminalizing rule of abortion 
even with the existence of sharia’a allowance according to one or more jurists. 
The court considered what is meant by sharia’a in Article 60 as being the law 
itself. Accordingly, personal rights that exempt punishment are only those that do 
not contradict with legal texts. The surprising part of the verdict is the statement 
that the allowance of abortion is not from the certain sharia’a. Here the Court of 
Cassation is trying to apply the Supreme Constitutional Court understanding of 
certain and uncertain sharia’a, insisting that certain sharia’a is the meaning of 
Article 60. Accordingly, the court required such sharia’a’s proof of authenticity 
and meaning to negate the penal code legislation. 
D. Conclusion 
The Egyptian criminal legal system maintains Islamic sharia’a as part of its 
application, as seen in Article 60. As the courts are uncertain about the meaning, 
values and purposes of applying Islamic sharia’a, court rulings reflect 
interpretation of Islamic sharia’a differently and on a case-by-case basis. 
Sometimes the courts follow stated legal rules even if they contradict with Islamic 
sharia’a. In other rulings the Islamic sharia’a application ignores the legal text. 
Because the Egyptian Court of Cassation has not formulated a consistent 
mechanism for applying Islamic sharia’a in accordance with Article 60, ongoing 
uncertainty and lack of consistency in decisions has ensued.
                                                                                                                                                
و40 /1 - 2 و41 هراثأ ام دروأ دق نعاطلا نأ ىلإ رظنلاب هنأ لاإ ،تابوقعلا نوناق نم  يف عوضوملا ةمكحم مامأ
أ نم ًادب ىرت لا ةمكحملا هذه نإف ،هنعط بابسأ نم لولأا هجولا اهنمض يتلا ةروصلا ىلع عفدلا اذه صوصخ ن
سيل رهشأ ةعبرأ زواجتي مل يذلا لمحلا ضاهجإ ةيملاسلإا ةعيرشلا ةحابإ نم نعاطلا هلوقي ام نأ ىلإ ريشت  ًلاصأ
إو اهيلع قفتملا اهتلدأ يف ًاتباثارتعلال لحم لاو ،مهنيب اميف يأرلا هلوح مسقنا ءاهقفلل داهتجا وه امن يذلا يأرلاب ض
فلس امك لعفلا اذه ميرحت نم هب لومعملا عيرشتلا يف مئاقلا عضولا ءاقلت نعاطلا هيلإ بهذي ام رهاظي لوقلا .  
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VII. Conclusion 
At the end of this research, it is interesting to note how the legal system in 
Egypt has been affected by the modernist ideas of the legal elite in Egypt 
and Western influence at the end of the nineteenth century. The most 
innovative idea was using Islamic legal principles such as takhayur and talfiq 
as modernizing tools. This idea succeeded practically in developing the legal 
system from the traditional one. The legal elite kept those principles to create 
a hybrid legal system resting between modernity and traditionalism. It was 
required to justify the modern legal text and win its acceptance. Incorporating 
Islamic sharia’a in the modern legal system was not only justified for social 
reasons, but also as being part of Egypt’s legal heritage and inspiration for 
developing the legal text similar to Roman law in the Western legal system.  
Such hybridity in a legal system leads to uncertainty in legal application 
because of the differences between the traditional and modern usages of 
takhayur and talfiq. The traditional application of sharia’a is based on the 
divinity of its rules, which justifies takhayur and talfiq amongst Islamic 
schools. In general, modern law does not embrace such a holistic approach 
in the legal texts. In addition, takhayur and talfiq were applied by laypersons 
and not state authorities as encouraged by Abdou and Sanhuri. The 
application of sharia’a and fiqh in the new legal system allowed courts to rely 
on different legal opinions which threatened the singularity of the legal 
answer. 
The judicial verdicts interpret Article 2 of the Egyptian constitution reflect very 
notable confusion regarding the meaning of sharia’a and its classification. 
The Court of Cassation has taken several different positions regarding Article 
2, by considering it a legislative issue, and at other times as a general rule 
applied to legal text through certain sharia’a principles. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court postponed interpreting Article 2 till 1993, when it 
interpreted it in the well-known case no.7. It classified sharia’a into certain 
and uncertain, whereby the certain sharia’a may not be breached by laws or 
judicial verdicts as part of the legal system. While the uncertain sharia’a is 
not identified specifically, the court considered it an open field for Ijtihad of 
legislative organs to exercise takhayur and talfiq. The encouragement of 
such classification is the court’s solution to the dilemma of applying sharia’a 
within a modern legal system. Despite this attempted solution, uncertainty 
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has remained in the legal system because of the non-clarity of the 
classification of certain and uncertain sharia’a. 
The Court of Cassation in its verdicts regarding Article 60 faced the problem 
of applying sharia’a as an exemption from the application of penal laws. But 
the Court cannot unify its policy regarding sharia’a, while the court 
encouraged the superiority of the legal text in abortion cases over the 
sharia’a texts, and in favoring the husband’s sharia’a right in disciplining his 
wife physically. Such uncertainty in dealing with sharia’a is the problem 
regarding its position it in the legal system. 
Efforts of the modernist thinkers to establish a new legal system which favors 
a precise form of legal application is worthy of respect. The current legal 
system has evolved as result of these efforts in comparison to the traditional 
system of the qadi. But this development was not sufficient to avoid later 
complexities and uncertainty of sharia’a including within the legal system. It is 
expected that the Egyptian legal system will be further developed following 
the January 25th Uprising and its aftermath. It may require separating 
sharia’a understandings from the legal text to achieve clarity of the legal rule. 
Such efforts to develop the legal system is connected to and not separate 
from attempts to understand the current legal system and its origins. 
Understanding the past and the present helps us to understand the future. 
 
